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General Questions
A. The Health Care System Framework
I. General Introduction
1. The health care system in overview
1Under the Swiss Federal Constitution, both the Cantons (Kantone/Cantons/
Cantoni) and the Federal State (Bund/Confédération/Confederazione) are com-
mitted to ensuring that all persons are secured against the economic risks
of sickness and accidents.1 An important role in this respect is played by
the different branches of social insurance, in particular by social health
insurance,2 social accident insurance3 and invalidity insurance.4
2The costs of medical care in Switzerland are covered by social health
insurance (Krankenversicherung/assurance-maladie/assicurazione malattie) and,
to a lesser extent, by social accident insurance (Unfallversicherung/assurance-
accidents/assicurazione contro gli infortuni) and invalidity insurance (Invaliden-
versicherung/assurance-invalidité/assicurazione per l’invalidità).5
3Social health insurance is, as a rule, compulsory for all individuals dom-
iciled in Switzerland, regardless of nationality, age, occupation, sex, or
1 Art 41(2) of the Swiss Constitution (Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft) of
18 April 1999, SR 101. The official German, French and Italian language versions of Swiss
Federal Acts are available online at <http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/sr.html>.
2 See infra, nos 10 ff.
3 See infra, nos 18 ff.
4 See infra, nos 22 f.
5 See A Maurer/G Scartazzini/M Hürzeler, Bundessozialversicherungsrecht (3rd edn 2009) § 12
no 42 ff; T Gächter/I Vollenweider, Gesundheitsrecht (2nd edn 2010) paras 829 ff, 840 ff.
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financial means.6 However, as the term ‘insurance’ implies, social health
insurance does not actually provide health care, but only bears the costs
for (certain) health care services required by the insured. Switzerland does
not have a national health care provider. Rather, health care is provided by
public and private hospitals, by doctors or other health care professionals.
Persons wishing to benefit from social health insurance are generally free
to choose their own health care provider.7
4 As a rule, compulsory social health insurance only covers the costs for
medical care in case of illness.8 It does not provide any entitlement to
pensions (Rente/rentes/rendite) or daily benefits (Taggeld/indemnités journal-
ières/indennità giornaliere).9 However, if a person’s capacity to work is
reduced due to a health impairment, entitlements to daily benefits or
pensions may arise under other branches of Swiss social security law, in
particular under the laws of social accident insurance and invalidity
insurance.
5 Entitlements under social accident insurance law only arise in cases of
‘accidents’ (ie a sudden, involuntary injury caused by an extraordinary and
extraneous event), not, however, in cases of mere ‘illness’, except if the
illness is work-related.10 If a patient is harmed by amedical procedure, it is
therefore of central importance whether the medical procedure can be
classified as an ‘accident’, a question which is often hotly debated.11 Social
accident insurance law is compulsory for persons who are employed in
Switzerland, although it is also available on a voluntary basis for self-
employed individuals.12
6 Art 3(1) of the Federal Health Insurance Act (HIA) (Bundesgesetz über die Krankenversiche-
rung [KVG]) of 18 March 1994, SR 832.10.
7 See infra, no 13.
8 See infra, no 10.
9 However, the Federal Health Insurance Act (fn 6) does provide for an optional daily
benefit insurance (art 67 HIA); see U Kieser, Schweizerisches Sozialversicherungsrecht
(2008) 278 f;Maurer/Scartazzini/Hürzeler (fn 5) § 15a.
10 Art 6(1) of the Federal Accident Insurance Act (AIA) (Bundesgesetz über die Unfallversiche-
rung [UVG]) of 20 March 1981, SR 832.20, in conjunction with art 4 of the Federal Act on
the General Principles of Social Security Law (GPSS) (Bundesgesetz über den Allgemeinen Teil
des Sozialversicherungsrechts [ATSG]) of 6 October 2000, SR 830.1. See generally Kieser (fn 9)
155 f.
11 See A Largier, Schädigende medizinische Behandlung als Unfall (2002) passim; Maurer/
Scartazzini/Hürzeler (fn 5) § 16 no 71; for an overview of the decisions of the Swiss Federal
Court, see A Rumo-Jungo, Bundesgesetz über die Unfallversicherung (3rd edn 2003) 23–
25, 30, 33 f. Cf also infra, no 26.
12 See arts 1a and 4 AIA (fn 10).
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6Entitlements under invalidity insurance law may arise in cases of ‘invalid-
ity’, ie in cases of reduction or loss of earning capacity due to a health
impairment.13 The cause of invalidity (ie accident, sickness or birth defect)
is irrelevant. Like social health insurance, invalidity insurance is compul-
sory for all individuals domiciled in Switzerland.14
7In principle, the availability of insurance coverage has no impact on the
legal relationship between the patient and the health care provider.15
Rather, it is the law under which the health care provider is organised
which is, as a rule, decisive. Thus, if the health care provider is a private
person, eg a private practitioner or a private hospital, the relationship
between the patient and the health care provider will be governed first
and foremost by federal private law. In contrast, if the health care provider
is a public hospital, the relationship with the patient will generally be
governed by cantonal public law.16
8In medical malpractice cases, the distinction between private federal law
and cantonal public law can become relevant in several ways.17 Firstly,
requirements for liability and statutes of limitation under cantonal public
law may differ from those under federal private law. Secondly, cantonal
public law may exclude the liability of certain persons, in particular by
providing that claims may only be brought directly against the Canton,
not, however, against the responsible individual. Thirdly, courts with
jurisdiction to hear cases governed by federal private law do not necessa-
rily have jurisdiction over cases governed by cantonal public law. And
finally, different procedural rules may apply. Thus, each of the 26 Swiss
cantons has its own distinct laws governing public procedure, whereas
civil procedure is governed by the new Federal Act on Civil Procedure,
which entered into force on 1 January 2011.18
13 SeeMaurer/Scartazzini/Hürzeler (fn 5) § 12 no 15 ff.
14 And also for other persons; see art 1b of the Federal Invalidity Insurance Act (IIA)
(Bundesgesetz über die Invalidenversicherung [IVG]) of 19 June 1959, SR 831.20, in conjunc-
tion with arts 1a and 2 of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors’ Insurance Act (Bundesgesetz
über die Alters- und Hinterlassenenversicherung [AHVG]) of 20 December 1946, SR 831.10.
15 See also infra, nos 24 and 81.
16 See infra, nos 45 and 95 ff.
17 See infra, nos 95 ff.
18 Federal Act on Civil Procedure (Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO]) of 19 December
2008, SR 272. See also infra, no 103.
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II. Social Welfare Provision
2. The role of public health care
9 As pointed out above,19 Switzerland does not have a national health care
provider. However, several different branches of social insurance play an
important role in public health care. These are, in particular, social health
insurance,20 social accident insurance21 and invalidity insurance.22
10 Social health insurance covers the costs of medical care in case of illness and
is, as a rule, compulsory for all individuals domiciled in Switzerland.23
Pensions or daily benefits are not available under compulsory social health
insurance.24 Compulsory social health insurance only provides coverage in
case of illness; in contrast, accidents are not covered. An exception is made
for accidents which are not covered by accident insurance.25 Insurance
premiums are owed and paid for by the insured individuals.
11 Although Swiss social health insurance is a state responsibility, there is no
monopoly with regard to its administration.26 Thus, social health insur-
ance can generally be administered by health insurance funds (Krankenkas-
sen/caisses-maladie/casse malati) organised under private or public law, or by
private insurance companies subject to insurance control,27 on condition
that they have been approved by the federal administration.28 There is no
statutory restriction on the admitted number of insurers.29 Insured per-
sons are free to choose and change their social health insurer provided
they observe the statutory termination periods.30
12 Social health insurance coverage is not automatic; rather, each person
domiciled in Switzerland is under a statutory obligation to take out social
19 Supra, no 3.
20 See infra, nos 10 ff.
21 See infra, nos 18 ff.
22 See infra, nos 22 f. On the coordination of the different branches of social security, see
Kieser (fn 9) 351 ff.
23 See supra, no 3.
24 On the optional daily benefit scheme, see fn 9.
25 Art 1(2)(b) HIA (fn 6).
26 See Gächter/Vollenweider (fn 5) para 689.
27 Federal Insurance Control Act (Bundesgesetz betreffend die Aufsicht über Versicherungsunter-
nehmen [Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz, VAG]) of 17 December 2004, SR 961.01.
28 See arts 11–13 HIA (fn 6).
29 See Gächter/Vollenweider (fn 5) para 690. Regularly updated official lists of admitted social
health insurers are available online, see <http://www.bag.admin.ch/themen/kranken-
versicherung/00295/index.html?lang=de> (12.01.11).
30 Arts 4(1), 7(1) and (2) HIA (fn 6).
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health insurance within three months.31 Social health insurers are not
allowed to refuse any person applying for insurance within their local area
of activity.32
13In general, insured persons wishing to benefit from social health insur-
ance coverage are free to choose any health care provider admitted under
Swiss social health insurance law,33 although they may agree to restrict
this freedom of choice in order to benefit from lower insurance pre-
miums.34
14The requirements for admission as a health care provider under Swiss
social health insurance law vary. In principle, medical doctors with a
federal (or equivalent) diploma and certificate of advanced vocational
training are automatically admitted as health care providers under Swiss
law.35 In consequence, social health insurers cannot choose which private
practitioners they (do not) wish to cooperate with, but must bear the costs
regardless, as long as the medical service itself is covered by social health
insurance.
15In contrast, hospitals must be formally admitted if their services are to be
paid for by social health insurance. Besides having to meet general
requirements regarding infrastructure, personnel and medical attend-
ance, hospitals must correspond to an actual medical ‘need’ of the popula-
tion.36 Only services provided by those hospitals which are included in the
so-called ‘hospital list’ (Spitalliste) of a Swiss Canton are covered by social
health insurance.37 However, if the statutory requirements are met, both
31 See art 3(1) HIA (fn 6).
32 Art 4(2) HIA (fn 6).
33 Art 41(1), (1bis) and (1ter) HIA (fn 6). On the different categories of admitted health care
providers, seeMaurer/Scartazzini/Hürzeler (fn 5) § 15 nos 152 ff.
34 Arts 41(4) and 62 HIA (fn 6).
35 Art 36 HIA (fn 6); arts 38, 39 of the Federal Health Insurance Regulation (HIR)
(Verordnung über die Krankenversicherung [KVV]) of 27 June 1995, SR 832.102. See T Poledna,
Arzt und Krankenversicherung, in: MW Kuhn/T Poledna (eds), Arztrecht in der Praxis
(2nd edn 2007) 393, 395 f. With a view to preventing further increases in social health
insurance premiums, a maximum cap on admitting new private practitioners was
introduced as a temporary (and highly controversial) federal measure in 2002. Its
validity was recently extended for certain categories of private practitioners and doctors
in ambulatory medical care institutions (until 31 December 2011). See art 55a(1)(d) HIA
(fn 6) in conjunction with arts 1 and 1a of the Federal Regulation on the Restriction of
the Admission of Health Care Providers under Compulsory Social Health Insurance
(Verordnung über die Einschränkung der Zulassung von Leistungserbringern zur Tätigkeit zu
Lasten der obligatorischen Krankenpflegeversicherung [VEZL]) of 3 July 2002, SR 832.103.
36 Art 39(1) HIA (fn 6).
37 Art 39(1)(e) HIA (fn 6).
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public and private hospitals can be admitted as health care providers for
the purposes of social health insurance.
16 Not all medical services are covered by social health insurance, although
coverage is very broad. In general terms, social health insurance covers the
costs for all medical services which aim to diagnose or treat an illness (or,
by way of exception, an accident)38 and its consequences, such as physical
examinations, treatment or patient care by doctors, and hospitalisation in
the general ward of admitted hospitals.39 Maternity-related medical ser-
vices are also covered.40 All medical services must satisfy the requirements
of efficacy, utility and cost effectiveness.41
17 If coverage is available under social health insurance, health care providers
must charge their patients on the basis of standard rates (Tarife/tarifs/
tariffe).42 Standard rates are generally agreed on between doctors’ profes-
sional associations on the one hand and social health insurers on the other;
such agreements (Tarifvertrag/convention tarifaire/convenzione tariffale) re-
quire approval by the authorities.43 All standard agreements regarding
ambulant medical services are based on a nationwide framework agree-
ment44 (TARMED)45 approved by the Federal Council (Bundesrat/Conseil
fédéral/Consiglio federale).
18 If an individual is insured under social accident insurance law, the costs of
medical care in case of an accident (as opposed to mere illness) will not be
covered by social health insurance, but by social accident insurance.46
Insurance covers both work-related and non-work-related accidents, and
also work-related illnesses.47 If a person’s capacity to work is reduced,
social accident insurance law also provides entitlements to pensions or
38 See supra, no 10.
39 See art 25 HIA (fn 6).
40 See art 29 HIA (fn 6).
41 Art 32 HIA (fn 6). See A Büchler/T Gächter, Medical Law: Switzerland, in: H Nys (ed),
Medical Law, International Encyclopedia of Laws (2010) paras 133 ff.
42 Art 44(1) HIA (fn 6). For details, see Maurer/Scartazzini/Hürzeler (fn 5) § 15 no 182 ff;
Poledna (fn 35) 393, 408 ff.
43 Art 46(4) HIA (fn 6).
44 Art 43(5) HIA (fn 6).
45 See Poledna (fn 35) 393, 408 ff; for the current versions of TARMED, see <http://
www.tarmedsuisse.ch> (12.01.11).
46 See supra, nos 5 and 10.
47 Art 6(1) AIA (fn 10); Maurer/Scartazzini/Hürzeler (fn 5) § 16 no 51 ff. Part-time employees
are only insured against the risk of non-work-related accidents if they are employed for
more than eight hours per week by any one employer; see art 7(2) AIA (fn 10) in
conjunction with art 13 of the Federal Accident Insurance Regulation (AIR) (Verordnung
über die Unfallversicherung [UVV]) of 20 December 1982, SR 832.202.
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daily benefits. Persons for whom social accident insurance law is compul-
sory, ie employees, must be insured through their employers. Insurance
premiums for work-related accidents and illnesses are paid for by the
employers, whereas insurance premiums for non-work-related accidents
are paid for by the insured.48
19For approximately a third of all employees,49 compulsory social accident
insurance is administered through the Swiss Accident Insurance Fund
(SUVA), an independent, non-profit company organised under federal
public law.50 Other employees may be insured with either a private
insurance company subject to insurance control, or an accident insurance
fund organised under public law, or an approved health insurance fund,
although in the latter case, pension entitlements are not insured.51 There
is no statutory restriction on the admitted number of insurers.52 Except
for those categories of employees for whom insurance with SUVA is
compulsory, employers are generally free to choose the social accident
insurer for their employees.53
20In principle, insured persons wishing to benefit from social accident
insurance coverage are free to choose any health care provider recognised
under social accident insurance law.54 Doctors with a federal (or equiva-
lent) diploma are automatically recognised as health care providers.55
However, social accident insurers may limit the patients’ freedom of
choice by entering into nation-wide cooperation agreements with health
care providers and entrusting such providers exclusively with the medical
treatment of the insured.56 Stationary institutions, such as hospitals and
convalescent homes, must meet certain statutory requirements57 and also
be party to a cooperation agreement with an insurer.58
48 Art 91 AIA (fn 10).
49 Maurer/Scartazzini/Hürzeler (fn 5) § 16 no 14.
50 Art 61 AIA (fn 10).
51 Art 70(2) AIA (fn 10); seeMaurer/Scartazzini/Hürzeler (fn 5) § 16 no 16.
52 Gächter/Vollenweider (fn 5) para 725. Regularly updated official lists of admitted social
accident insurers are available online; see <http://www.bag.admin.ch/themen/versicher
ung/00321/index.html?lang=de> (12.01.11).
53 Art 69 AIA (fn 10).
54 Art 10(2) AIA (fn 10).
55 Art 53(1) AIA (fn 10).
56 Art 56 AIA (fn 10) in conjunction with art 70(1) AIR (fn 47). See Gächter/Vollenweider (fn 5)
para 732.
57 See art 68(1) and (2) AIR (fn 47).
58 See arts 15 and 68(3) AIR (fn 47).
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21 Social accident insurance coverage for medical services is generally the
same as under social health insurance.59 In particular, medical services
must satisfy the requirements of efficacy, utility and cost effectiveness.60
Unlike social health insurance, however, social accident insurance law also
provides entitlements to pensions or daily benefits.61
22 In case of invalidity,62 costs for certain types of medical care for insured
persons up to the age of 20 are covered by invalidity insurance, which is
compulsory for all individuals domiciled in Switzerland.63 However,
except in case of birth defects, only costs for medical care aimed directly
at integrating the patient into the work (or similar) environment are
covered.64 Other entitlements may also arise, such as to daily benefits or
pensions.65 Invalidity insurance is administered by cantonal public inva-
lidity insurance funds (IV-Stelle/Offices AI/Uffici AI) together with the insti-
tutions that administer Old-Age and Survivors’ Insurance (AHV/AVS/
AVS).66
23 In principle, insured persons wishing to benefit from social invalidity
insurance coverage are free to choose any health care provider recognised
under Swiss social invalidity insurance law.67 Doctors with a federal (or
equivalent) diploma are automatically recognised as health care providers.68
24 As pointed out above,69 the availability of social insurance coverage gen-
erally has no effect on the legal relationship between patient and health
care provider.70 If the health care provider is, eg a private practitioner or a
private hospital, the patient will receive medical treatment by way of an
individual contract with the practitioner or hospital.71 In contrast, if the
health care provider is a public hospital, cantonal public law will deter-
59 SeeMaurer/Scartazzini/Hürzeler (fn 5) § 16 no 98.
60 See arts 10(1) and 54 AIA (fn 10); BGE 123 V 53, 59 (Federal Court decision of 20
February 1997); Gächter/Vollenweider (fn 5) paras 727 ff. Published and, from 2000
onwards, also unpublished Federal Court decisions are available at <http://
www.bger.ch>.
61 Cf Kieser (fn 9) 279 ff, 337 ff;Maurer/Scartazzini/Hürzeler (fn 5) § 16 no 113 ff, 116 ff.
62 On the meaning of invalidity, see supra, no 6.
63 See supra, no 6.
64 Art 12(1) IIA (fn 14); seeMaurer/Scartazzini/Hürzeler (fn 5) § 12 no 42 ff.
65 Cf Kieser (fn 9) 276 ff, 328 ff;Maurer/Scartazzini/Hürzeler (fn 5) § 12 no 30 ff.
66 On the organisation of Swiss invalidity insurance, see Maurer/Scartazzini/Hürzeler (fn 5)
§ 12 no 3 ff.
67 Arts 26 ff IIA (fn 14);Maurer/Scartazzini/Hürzeler (fn 5) § 12 no 79.
68 Art 26(1), (2) IIA (fn 14).
69 Supra, no 7.
70 See also infra, no 81.
71 See infra, nos 77 ff; see also infra, no 45.
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mine the nature of the legal relationship between hospital and patient.72
Both under social health, accident and invalidity insurance, patients are
generally free to choose their health care provider.73 Accordingly, it is their
choice, rather than the question of insurance coverage, which will influ-
ence whether potential damages claims for medical malpractice will be
subject to private or public law. However, it has been suggested that
cantonal public law should also apply where patients are treated in a
private hospital, insofar as such treatment is covered by social health
insurance.74
3. Differences in treating patient’s claims
25If a patient is harmed during the course of medical treatment provided by a
private practitioner or hospital, his claims for compensation, if any, will be
directed against the health care provider itself and/or (where applicable) its
employees.75 If the patient was treated in a public hospital, cantonal law
may provide that claims shall be brought exclusively against the Canton
where such hospital is located.76 In both instances it is in principle irrele-
vant whether the harmful medical treatment was (wholly or partially)
covered by social health insurance or not. Social health insurance coverage
has no impact on the liability of the health care provider. The same applies
if the medical treatment in question was covered by social accident insur-
ance77 or invalidity insurance. However, social security coverage does have
an impact on the amount of damages owed directly to the patient by the
liable health care provider, as the insurers’ contributions will be deducted
from the patient’s damages claim.78
26With respect to a patient’s social security claims it is in principle irrelevant
whether the medical procedure which harmed the patient was already
covered by social insurance. However, an exception applies to social
accident insurance claims. As pointed out above, social accident insurance
72 See infra, nos 95 ff; see also infra, no 45.
73 See supra, nos 13, 20, 23.
74 See T Eichenberger, Arzt am Spital, in: Kuhn/Poledna (fn 35) 351, 353; P Jäger/A Schweiter,
Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichts zum Arzthaftpflicht- und Arztstrafrecht (2nd edn
2006) 19.
75 Cf infra, nos 45 ff, 77 ff.
76 See infra, nos 95 ff.
77 See TA Bühlmann, Die rechtliche Stellung der Medizinalpersonen im Bundesgesetz über
die Unfallversicherung vom 20. März 1981 (1985) 155 f, 196 f.
78 Cf infra, nos 27 ff.
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claims only arise in case of an ‘accident’.79 If, however, a patient is harmed
during medical treatment for an injury which in itself constitutes an
‘accident’ (eg during medical treatment for an injury suffered in a car
accident), such harm will be sufficient to give rise to social accident
insurance claims. It will not be necessary for the harmful event to also
qualify as an ‘accident’.80
4. Right of recourse
27 To the extent that a patient who has suffered harm in the course of
medical treatment is legally entitled to contributions from social health,
accident or invalidity insurers, such insurers subrogate in all claims of the
insured and the insured’s survivors against those providing the treatment,
regardless of the basis of such claims (ie tort or contract).81 Subrogation
takes place at the moment of the event.82
28 This right of recourse is also exercised in practice primarily by those
insurers whose contributions are long-term, such as social accident insur-
ance and, in particular, invalidity insurance. Both the Swiss Accident
Insurance Fund (SUVA)83 and the Federal Social Insurance Office (FSIO)
operate a division dedicated solely to recourse against liable third par-
ties.84 In the case of medical malpractice, the practice of SUVA is to
exercise its right of recourse if its own doctors consider the case to be
clear-cut. SUVA will then endeavour to reach an agreement with the
health care provider’s liability insurer, if necessary based on an expert
opinion jointly commissioned by both insurers.85 In practice, however,
subrogation by invalidity insurance is more important, and in case of
79 See supra, no 5.
80 Art 6(3) AIA (fn 10); art 10 AIR (fn 47). See, eg, BGE 128 V 169, 171 (Federal Court
decision of 2 May 2002).
81 Art 72 GPSS (fn 10).
82 See U Kieser, ATSG-Kommentar (2nd edn 2009) art 72 para 12.
83 See supra, no 19.
84 Cf art 14 of the Federal Regulation on the General Principles of Social Security Law
(Verordnung über den Allgemeinen Teil des Sozialversicherungsrechts [ATSV]) of 11 September
2002, SR 830.11. See also the official site of the FSIO, <http://www.regress.admin.ch/
regress/organisation/d/index.htm> (12.01.11).
85 Information obtained with thanks from lic.iur. Sylvia Läubli Ziegler, head of the
recourse division of SUVA, in January 2010.
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dispute, such claims are also brought before court.86 Social health insurers
only rarely exercise their right of recourse.87
29As pointed out above,88 any social insurance contributions to which the
patient is entitled will be deducted from any claim brought by the patient
against the liable party.89 However, the insured patient is entitled to the
so-called preferential quota of damages (Quotenvorrecht/droit préférentiel/
diritto preferenziale).90
III. Private Insurance
5. The role of private health insurance
30In addition to compulsory social health insurance, persons may take out
supplementary private health insurance (Zusatzversicherungen/assurances
complémentaires/assicurazioni complementari). Private health insurance com-
plements social health insurance in that it offers benefits beyond those
provided under social health insurance, for example by granting access to
the private or semi-private ward of a hospital. For persons unable to
benefit from social accident insurance law or wishing to take out comple-
mentary accident insurance, private accident insurance is also available.91
31Contracts for private health or accident insurance are governed primarily
by private law.92 The contents of such contracts can be determinedmore or
less freely by the insured and the insurer; in the case of private health
insurance, relatively few restrictions apply.93
32To the extent that a patient who has suffered harm in the course of
medical treatment has actually received indemnification from his private
86 For a recent example, see BGE 134 III 636 (Federal Court decision of 23 September
2008).
87 See O Guillod, Compensation in the Swiss Health Care Sector, in: J Dute/MG Faure/H
Koziol (eds), No-Fault Compensation in the Health Care Sector (2004) 392, 411 (at no
78).
88 Supra, no 25.
89 Art 73(3) GPSS (fn 10).
90 Art 73 GPSS (fn 10). See Kieser (fn 82) art 73 paras 1 ff; G Frésard-Fellay, Le recours
subrogatoire de l’assurance-accidents sociale contre le tiers responsable ou son assureur
(2007) paras 968 ff.
91 SeeMaurer/Scartazzini/Hürzeler (fn 5) § 16 no 94; R Nebel, in: H Honsell (ed), Bundesgesetz
über den Versicherungsvertrag (VVG) (2001) art 101 no 54.
92 In particular by the Federal Act on Insurance Contracts (AIC) (Bundesgesetz über den
Versicherungsvertrag [Versicherungsvertragsgesetz, VVG]) of 2 April 1908, SR 221.229.1.
93 SeeMaurer/Scartazzini/Hürzeler (fn 5) § 15 no 217 ff.
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health or accident insurer,94 such insurer subrogates in the claims of the
insured against the person providing the treatment.95 However, under
federal insurance contract law, subrogation only takes place with respect
to claims in tort, as opposed to claims in contract.96 Moreover, subrogation
under federal insurance contract law requires that the tortfeasor acted
intentionally or negligently; strict liability is not sufficient.97 If the third
party is liable only in contract, it is controversial whether a private insurer
may nonetheless take recourse against such party based on the general
provisions of the Code of Obligations.98 In any case, the insured patient is
entitled to the preferential quota of damages.99
6. Liability insurance
33 Where a patient alleges medical malpractice, claims will often be consid-
ered by the health care provider’s liability insurer before the claim is
brought before a court. Until September 2007, liability insurance for
medical activities was only compulsory under federal law in a few specific
areas.100 Outside these areas, it was for the Cantons to decide whether to
introduce compulsory liability insurance for medical practitioners. How-
ever, the new Federal Act on Academic Medical Professions now provides
that all persons who practice an academic medical profession indepen-
dently must take out professional liability insurance or provide other,
equivalent security, regardless of the type of medical activity involved.101
34 Whether or not health care providers which fall outside the scope of this
Act (such as hospitals, academic medical professionals conducting their
94 Contrast art 72 GPSS (fn 10), pursuant to which the mere fact of entitlement already
triggers subrogation by social insurers; see supra, no 27.
95 Art 72(1) AIC (fn 92).
96 Art 72(1) AIC (fn 92). See AK Schnyder in: H Honsell et al (eds), Basler Kommentar:
Obligationenrecht I (art 1–529 OR) (4th edn 2007) art 51 no 22; C Graber in: Honsell (fn
91) Art 72 no 7.
97 BGE 120 II 191, 196 (Federal Court decision of 23 June 1994); R Brehm, Berner
Kommentar zum schweizerischen Privatrecht, Bd VI, 1. Abt, 3. Teilbd, 1. Unterteilbd:
Kommentar zu Art 41–61 OR (1998) art 51 no 61; Schnyder (fn 96) art 51 no 22; Graber
(fn 96) art 72 no 7, 9; H Hausheer, Unsorgfältige ärztliche Behandlung, in: P Münch/T
Geiser (eds), Schaden – Haftung – Versicherung (1999) para 15.124.
98 Namely arts 50 and 51 of the Code of Obligations (CO) (Bundesgesetz betreffend die
Ergänzung des Schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuches [Fünfter Teil: Obligationenrecht]) of 30 March
1911, SR 220; see Brehm (fn 97) art 51 no 111 ff; Graber (fn 96) art 72 no 8.
99 Cf Hausheer (fn 97) para 15.124; Graber (fn 96) art 72 no 36 ff. Cf also supra, no 29.
100 See infra, no 34.
101 Art 40 lit h of the Federal Act on Academic Medical Professions (AAMP) (Bundesgesetz
über die universitären Medizinalberufe [MedBG]) of 23 June 2006, SR 811.11.
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practice in the form of a company by whom they are employed, or non-
academic medical professionals) must take out professional liability insur-
ance remains a matter for cantonal law,102 except with respect to a few
specific areas as mentioned above. Thus, liability insurance must be taken
out under federal law where ionizing radiation or radioactive substances
are applied to the human body.103 Where clinical drug trials are conducted
on humans, the person or institution managing or financing the trial
must take out liability insurance or provide other, equivalent security.104
Liability insurance for an amount of CHF 20million or equivalent security
is also required for xenotransplantation procedures.105
35According to a report of the Federal Health Office from the year 2005,106
the following annual liability insurance premiums can be considered
typical for doctors practicing in Switzerland (calculated on the basis of an
insured amount of CHF 5 million and a franchise of CHF 200):107
n general medicine: approx CHF 1,000;
n surgery (excluding cosmetic and plastic surgery): approx CHF 6,500;
n internal medicine, including gastroenterology and endoscopy: approx
CHF 4,000;
n otorhinolaryngology: approx CHF 6,500;
102 C Müller, Medizinische Berufshaftpflichtversicherung, Aktuelle Juristische Praxis (AJP)
2007, 329, 336; see generally W Fellmann, in: A Ayer/U Kieser/T Poledna/D Sprumont
(eds), Medizinalberufegesetz (MedBG): Kommentar (2009) art 40 no 16 f.
103 Art 28 in conjunction with art 31 lit d of the Federal Act on Radioprotection
(Strahlenschutzgesetz [StSG]) of 22 March 1991, SR 814.50.
104 Art 54(1)(b) of the Federal Act on Drugs andMedical Products (DMPA) (Bundesgesetz über
Arzneimittel und Medizinprodukte [Heilmittelgesetz, HMG]) of 15 December 2000, SR
812.21, in conjunction with art 7(2) of the Federal Regulation on Clinical Trials with
Drugs and Medical Products (CTR) (Verordnung über klinische Versuche mit Heilmitteln
[VKlin]) of 17 October 2001, SR 812.214.2.
105 Art 46 lit a of the Federal Act on Transplantation of Organs, Tissue and Cells (TA)
(Bundesgesetz über die Transplantation von Organen, Geweben und Zellen [Transplantationsge-
setz]) of 8 October 2004, SR 810.21, in conjunction with art 26(1), (2) of the Federal
Regulation on Transplantation of Animal Organs, Tissue and Cells (Verordnung über die
Transplantation von tierischen Organen, Geweben und Zellen [Xenotransplantationsverordnung])
of 16 March 2007, SR 810.213.
106 Bundesamt für Gesundheit (BAG), Bericht zu Handen der SGK-S, Auftrag SGK-N vom
28.4.2005: Abklärungen zumObligatorium der Berufshaftpflichtversicherung/Berufs-
haftpflicht der Ärztinnen und Ärzte, accessible at <http://www.bag.admin.ch/themen/
berufe/00993/01238/01268/index.html> (12.01.11); see also Müller, AJP 2007, 329,
333.
107 On the liability insurance market in Switzerland, see also M Pergolis, Die Haftpflicht-
versicherung für Ärzte und Spitäler, in: W Fellmann/T Poledna (eds), Die Haftung des
Arztes und des Spitals (2003) 167 ff; Guillod (fn 87) 392, 410 f (at para 74).
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n urology: approx CHF 6,000;
n paediatrics: approx CHF 1,200;
n plastic surgery (pure cosmetic surgery): approx CHF 20,000–60,000.
36 According to unofficial estimates, the total amount of insurance pre-
miums paid by all Swiss public hospitals lies somewhere between CHF
50–100 million per year.108
IV. Professional Standards
7. Applicable professional standards
37 All persons practicing an academic medical profession independently
must comply with the general professional rules set out in federal law. In
particular, such persons are required to ‘practice their profession carefully
and conscientiously and to respect the limits of the skills acquired through
university education, postgraduate training and advanced vocational
training.’109 Violations of these rules may entail disciplinary sanctions.110
More specific rules are set out in federal acts relating to particularly
sensitive areas, such as organ transplantation.111 Professional rules for
those health care providers to whom federal law does not apply,112 remain
a matter of cantonal law.113
38 Members of the Swiss Medical Association (FMH) are also subject to the
association’s rules of professional conduct (Standesordnung/Code de déontologie/
codice deontologico),114 which provide that doctors must practice their profes-
sion ‘carefully and conscientiously’.115 A violation of these rules can be
108 PJ Meier/M Klee, Ärztehaftpflicht: Versicherer sahnen ab, Beobachter 24/2008.
109 Art 40 lit a AAMP (fn 101).
110 Art 43 AAMP (fn 101). SeeMMarti/P Straub, Arzt und Berufsrecht, in: Kuhn/Poledna (fn
35) 233, 258 f.
111 See art 4 TA (fn 105), pursuant to which persons handling organs, tissue or cells are
required to take all measures necessary according to the latest findings of science and
technology in order to prevent health risks. See also W Fellmann, Arzt und das
Rechtsverhältnis zum Patienten, in: Kuhn/Poledna (fn 35) 103, 124 ff.
112 See MedBG/Fellmann (fn 102) art 40 no 15 ff.
113 See, eg, § 19(1) of the Health Act of the Canton of Zurich (Gesundheitsgesetz) of 2 April
2007, accessible at <http://www.zhlex.zh.ch> (12.01.11).
114 Available at <http://www.fmh.ch/fmh/rechtliche_grundlagen/standesordnung.html>
(12.01.11).
115 Art 3(1) (fn 114).
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sanctioned by the FMH professional conduct committee. However, as the
FMH is a private organisation, its rules are only binding on its members.
39The various guidelines of the Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences,116 such as
guidelines on reanimation, palliative care or coercive measures, also lack
binding authority as the Academy does not have law-making power.117
40Where a patient has suffered harm in the course of medical treatment, the
test applied by the courts is generally whether the doctor acted lege artis, ie
in accordance with the ‘generally recognised rules of the medical profes-
sion’.118 The nature and scope of these ‘generally recognised rules’ are
determined in the instant case on the basis of expert advice.119 According
to the Federal Court, the requirements ‘cannot be fixed once and for all.
Rather, they depend on the particularities of the instant case, such as the
nature of the intervention or the treatment and the associated risks, the
scope for discretion, the time and means available, and the training and
capacity of the doctor.’120
41Violations of the leges artis constitute a breach of contract and, if the
further requirements are met, may lead to contractual liability for pecuni-
ary and non-pecuniary loss.121 In tort, a violation of the leges artismay lead
to unlawfulness.122 Moreover, both in contract and in tort claims, the act
of departing from professional standards constitutes fault.123
8. Quality and/or risk management systems
42The Federal Council has the power to introduce systematic quality con-
trols with regard to those medical services which are covered by social
health insurance. It may entrust professional or other associations with
these controls.124
43To date, the Federal Council has merely introduced a legal obligation on
all health care providers admitted under social health insurance law (or
116 See <http://www.samw.ch> (12.01.11).
117 Cf D Rüetschi, Die Medizinisch-ethischen Richtlinien der SAMW aus juristischer Sicht,
Schweizerische Ärztezeitung (SÄZ) No 23/2004, 1222 ff.
118 See, eg, BGE 133 III 121, 124 (Federal Court decision of 9 February 2007).
119 See Fellmann (fn 111) 103, 120 ff.
120 See, eg, BGE 133 III 121, 124 (Federal Court decision of 9 February 2007).
121 Cf infra, nos 82 and 86.
122 See infra, nos 51 f. For an overview of the decisions of the Swiss Federal Court relating
to doctors’ professional standards, see Jäger/Schweiter (fn 74) 31 ff, 37 ff.
123 Cf Guillod (fn 87) 392, 394 (at para 8).
124 Art 58(1) and (2) HIA (fn 6).
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their professional associations) to develop concepts of, and programmes
on, quality standards and quality advancement.125 However, the modal-
ities of quality control and the consequences of failure to comply with
quality standards are not set out in federal law; rather, these must be
developed and agreed on by health care providers and insurers (or their
respective associations). Currently, there are no such agreements in
place.126 However, several hospitals andmanaged care networks of general
practitioners have introduced quality management systems on a voluntary
basis, or are considering doing so.127
44 As far as risk management is concerned, health care professionals are
under an obligation to inform the authorities in certain statutorily de-
fined situations, in particular in case of uncertain cause of death.128
However, there is no legal obligation to introduce actual risk management
systems. Nonetheless, several hospitals have introduced such systems on a
voluntary basis.129
B. Tort Liability
9. Fundamentals of tort liability
45 In the context of medical malpractice in Switzerland, it is essential to
distinguish between liability under federal private law on the one hand,
and liability under cantonal public law on the other. In general, federal
private law will apply if the health care provider is a private person (eg a
private hospital or a private practitioner). However, there are exceptions.
Thus, where a Canton has delegated the exercise of State power (imperium)
to a private hospital, the relationship between patient and hospital may be
subject to cantonal public law.130 Moreover, where a public hospital has
been privatised, the majority opinion in Switzerland is that the liability of
125 Art 77 HIR (fn 35).
126 See Maurer/Scartazzini/Hürzeler (fn 5) § 15 no 210.
127 Cf, eg, the website of the EQUAM association: <http://www.equam.org> (12.01.11).
128 For an overview, seeU Zollinger/K Hartmann, ÄrztlicheMelderechte undMeldepflichten
gegenüber Justiz und Polizei, SÄZ No 26/2001, 1384 ff.
129 On the current situation with regard to clinical risk management systems, seeM Briner
et al, Erste Schweizer Erhebung zum klinischen Risikomanagement im Spital, SÄZ
No 15–16/2009, 635 ff. Several hospitals have also introduced Critical Incident Report-
ing Systems (CIRS); see U Haller et al, Von der Schuldfrage zur Fehlerkultur in der
Medizin, SÄZ No 27/2005, 1665 ff; H Kuhn, It is forbidden to crash this airplane, in:
Fellmann/Poledna (fn 107) 181, 210, 211.
130 See the references to case law in Jäger/Schweiter (fn 74) 20 ff.
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such hospital will remain subject to cantonal public law.131 It is contro-
versial whether a private hospital’s liability should also be subject to
cantonal public law where a patient’s treatment is covered by social health
insurance.132 Finally, where the liability of public hospital doctors toward
their private patients is concerned, the Cantons are free to preempt federal
private law.133
46The following paragraphs on tort liability are confined to liability under
federal private law. Liability under cantonal public law will be discussed
separately,134 as will liability in contract.135
47Under the general clause of art 41(1) of the Code of Obligations (CO),136
four requirements must be met for liability in tort. Firstly, a person must
have suffered damage, ie a pecuniary loss (Schaden/dommage/danno). Sec-
ondly, such damage must be wrongful (widerrechtlich/illicite/illecito).
Thirdly, there must be a causal link between the wrongful conduct and
the damage suffered, ie the conduct must be a conditio sine qua non of the
damage suffered (so-called ‘natural causation’; natürliche Kausalität/causa-
lité naturelle/causalità naturale), and such damage must not be too remote
(so-called ‘adequate causation’; adäquate Kausalität/causalité adéquate/causa-
lità adeguata). Finally, it is required that the tortfeasor was at fault, ie that
he was of sufficient mental capacity (Urteilsfähigkeit/capacité de discernement/
capacità di discernimento) and that he acted either intentionally or negli-
gently.137 It is undisputed in today’s case law that a doctor is liable for any
fault, regardless of the degree.138
48A person may also be held responsible for the wrongful conduct of third
parties under art 55(1) CO (vicarious liability). Other than the general
requirements of damage, wrongfulness and causation, liability under art
55(1) CO requires that the person who actually caused the damage (the
‘servant’) must be subordinated to the party who is to be held liable (the
131 See J Gross, Haftung des Spitalarztes und des Spitals, in: Fellmann/Poledna (fn 107) 35,
44 f; Fellmann (fn 111) 103, 109 f. On the liability of privatised hospitals, see generally
M Hofer/S Schmid-Geene, Die Haftung privatisierter Spitäler – ein Überblick, Haftung
und Versicherung (HAVE) 2002, 196 ff.
132 See supra, no 24 and the references in fn 74.
133 See infra, nos 80 and 97 and the references in fn 280.
134 See infra, nos 95 ff.
135 See infra, nos 77 ff.
136 See fn 98.
137 See H Rey, Ausservertragliches Haftpflichtrecht (4th edn 2008) paras 805 ff, 834 ff;
Brehm (fn 97) art 41 no 1 ff.
138 See, eg, BGE 133 III 121, 124 (Federal Court decision of 9 February 2007); BGE 113 II
429, 432 f (Federal Court decision of 3 November 1987); Guillod (fn 87) 392, 394 f (at
para 11). For an overview of the development in case law, see id (fn 87) at paras 8 ff.
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‘master’). A person is ‘subordinated’ for the purposes of art 55(1) CO if he
is subject to another’s supervision and authority to issue directives.139 The
legal nature of the relationship between ‘master’ and ‘servant’ is irrele-
vant. Rather, it is the de facto subordination of one person to another which
is decisive.140 Both natural persons (eg a private practitioner) and legal
persons (eg a hospital with independent legal personality) can be ‘master’
for the purposes of art 55(1) CO.
49 Liability under art 55(1) CO also requires that the damage must have been
caused in the course of the subordinated person’s work or duties (in
Ausübung der geschäftlichen oder dienstlichen Verrichtung/dans l’accomplissement
de son travail/nell’esercizio delle incombenze di servizio o d’affari). A merely
accidental connection to the subordinated person’s work or duties will
not suffice.141
50 A party may avoid liability under art 55(1) CO by proving that he took all
precautions necessary to prevent damage of the kind suffered, namely that
he exercised all due diligence in selecting, instructing and overseeing the
‘servant’ (curae in eligendo, instruendo et custodiendo), and also that all work
processes were organised diligently. If this proof fails, he may still avoid
liability if he can show that damage would have occurred even if all due
diligence had been exercised.142
51 In the context of medical malpractice, particular importance lies with the
requirement of wrongfulness under art 41(1) and art 55(1) CO. Under the
majority opinion, each and any interference with a person’s physical
integrity constitutes wrongfulness for the purposes of tort law, unless
the tortfeasor can invoke grounds for justification. The Swiss Federal
Court has constantly held that this also applies in the medical context, so
that prima facie, any interference with a patient’s physical integrity con-
stitutes wrongfulness, even if the intervention was made by a doctor with
the purpose of healing the patient, and even if there was no mistake in
treatment.143 The doctor can avoid liability by showing that such inter-
vention was justified, in particular by proving that the patient gave his
139 See, eg, Brehm (fn 97) art 55 no 7 ff, 11 ff; Rey (fn 137) paras 903 ff.
140 See, eg, Rey (fn 137) para 904; Brehm (fn 97) art 55 no 7.
141 See, eg, Rey (fn 137) paras 912 ff.
142 See generally Brehm (fn 97) art 55 no 45 ff. On liability for organisational deficiencies,
see infra, nos 61 f.
143 See, eg, BGE 108 II 59, 62 (Federal Court decision of 12 January 1982); unpublished
Federal Court decision 4C.378/1999 of 23 November 2004, at para 3.1; for further
references, see Jäger/Schweiter (fn 74) 65 ff. For a critique of this development, see V
Roberto, Schweizerisches Haftpflichtrecht (2002) paras 93 ff.
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informed consent.144 If he succeeds in proving this, the intervention will
only be considered wrongful if the patient can show that the intervention
was not lege artis, which is often very difficult to prove.
52If a medical intervention which interferes with a patient’s physical integ-
rity is not lege artis, the requirement of wrongfulness will always be met.
Informed consent does not cover mistakes in treatment.145
53A characteristic of Swiss tort law is its comparatively short statute of
limitations. The general limitation period for pecuniary and non-pecuniary
loss claims in tort is one year from the day that the harmed person acquired
knowledge of the damage and the liable party’s identity. In any event, the
maximum limitation period is ten years from the day of the harmful
conduct.146 The short one-year period is one of the reasons why claimants
generally prefer to sue in contract rather than in tort.147 The extension of
the general limitation period for tort claims is currently on the political
agenda.148 Longer time periods are already provided for in other federal
acts, such as the Federal Act on Radioprotection149 or the Product Liability
Act,150 and may also apply where the injury was caused by an act which
constitutes a criminal offence.151 Claims brought under cantonal public law
are subject to the respective Canton’s statute of limitations.152
10. Burden of proof
54The burden of proof is allocated by federal law. In general, the person
seeking compensation from another must prove that he has suffered
damage, that such damage was caused by the alleged tortfeasor, and that
such tortfeasor was at fault.153 These rules also apply in the area of medical
144 On the consequences of failure to prove informed consent, see infra, nos 89 ff.
145 See, eg, Federal Court decision 4C.378/1999 of 23 November 2004, at para 3.1; BGE
123 II 577, 583 (Federal Court decision of 12 September 1997).
146 Art 60 CO (fn 98).
147 See infra, no 83.
148 See the Federal Council’s press release of 21 January 2009, available at <http://
www.ejpd.admin.ch/ejpd/de/home/dokumentation/mi/2009/2009-01-21.html>
(12.01.11).
149 See Guillod (fn 87) 392, 409 (at para 67).
150 See infra, no 74.
151 Art 60(2) CO (fn 98); see Guillod (fn 87) 392, 409 (at para 66).
152 See infra, no 102.
153 Art 8 of the Swiss Civil Code (CC) (Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch) of 10 December 1907,
SR 210.
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malpractice.154 Moreover, the damaged party must prove the facts on
which he bases his allegation of wrongfulness, eg the doctor’s alleged
mistake in treatment.
55 In a much-criticised decision,155 the Federal Court held that in certain
circumstances, the mere fact of a negative outcome may lead to a ‘natural
presumption’ of medical malpractice.156 In this case, a patient had re-
ceived peri- and intraarticular injections of cortisone preparations which
ultimately and irreversibly destroyed her humeral head and shoulder
socket. According to the Federal Court, ‘if a doctor could and should
recognise that the proposed medical treatment might have adverse effects,
he is required to take all necessary precautions to avoid such effects. If
such effects occur, there will be a natural presumption that the doctor
failed to take the necessary precautions.’157 The doctor may rebut this
presumption, for example by showing which precautions he took in order
to avoid the adverse outcome and that even with the utmost care, a
remaining risk could not be avoided.158 However, the Federal Court later
clarified that not every adverse outcome might establish such a ‘natural
presumption’, and that its decision had been inseparably linked to the
particular facts of that case.159
56 The burden of proof with regard to causation (conditio sine qua non-test) has
hitherto not been shifted to the tortfeasor in medical malpractice cases,
not even in cases of grave mistake. However, the standard of proof of
causation is at least relaxed in medical malpractice cases.160 Thus, it is
sufficient that the mistake more likely than not caused the damage
154 See, eg, unpublished Federal Court decision 4C.378/1999 of 23 November 2004, at
para 3.2; Hausheer (fn 97) paras 15.79 ff; MW Kuhn, Arzt und Haftung aus Kunst- bzw.
Behandlungsfehlern, in: Kuhn/Poledna (fn 35) 601, 613; T Sutter-Somm/B Spitz, Beweis-
fragen im Arzthaftungsprozess, in: Fellmann/Poledna (fn 107) 143, 150 ff; O Guillod,
Responsabilité médicale: de la faute objectivée à l’absence de faute, in: C Chappuis/B
Winiger, Responsabilités objectives (2003) 155, 159 f.
155 See H Hausheer, Country Report: Switzerland, in: M Faure/H Koziol (eds), Cases on
Medical Malpractice in a Comparative Perspective (2001) 201, 216 f; idem (fn 97) para
15.83; for further references, see Sutter-Somm/Spitz (fn 154) 143, 152 f.
156 BGE 120 II 248, 250 (Federal Court decision of 29 July 1994).
157 BGE 120 II 248, 250 (Federal Court decision of 29 July 1994).
158 BGE 120 II 248, 250 (Federal Court decision of 29 July 1994).
159 Unpublished Federal Court decision 4C.53/2000 of 13 June 2000, at para 2.b.
160 On the regular standard of proof and its exceptions, see R Brehm, Schadenersatz für
Körperschäden in der Schweiz, in: BA Koch/H Koziol (eds), Compensation for Personal
Injury in a Comparative Perspective (2003) 325, 334 f (at paras 41–48).
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suffered.161 Also, where an omission (rather than an act) is at issue, the
Federal Court has held that a doctor is required to cooperate in the
evidentiary proceedings before the court.162 Although the burden of proof
is not shifted to the doctor, the court may take a failure to cooperate into
account when appreciating the evidence.163 The mere possibility of causa-
tion is, however, never sufficient.164
57Thus, the patient seeking compensation for medical malpractice faces two
hurdles. Firstly, he must prove that a mistake in treatment actually
occurred, and secondly, he must prove that such mistake was a conditio
sine qua non of the damage suffered. Because of these difficulties of proof, it
is generally easier for a patient to allege that he was not properly advised
of the risks of an intervention.165
58In its published case law, the Federal Court has left open the question of
whether the burden of proof of causation may exceptionally be shifted to
the doctor (or other health care provider) if evidence has been destroyed or
concealed, be it intentionally or negligently, or if the clinical records are
incomplete. However, in such situations, the court may relax the standard
of proof.166
11. Uncertain causation
59As pointed out above,167 a patient bringing a claim for medical malpractice
must at least be able to prove that the treatment more likely than not
caused the damage suffered. If this standard of proof is not satisfied, ie if
the existence of a causal link between treatment and damage is uncertain,
the patient’s claim will fail.168 Thus, if it is unclear whether the patient’s
situation deteriorated because of the treatment or in the ordinary course
of his pre-existing condition, and neither can be said to be the more likely
cause of deterioration, liability for medical malpractice will be denied.
161 See, eg, unpublished Federal Court decision 4C.378/1999 of 23 November 2004, at
para 3.2; BGE 133 III 462, 470 f (Federal Court decision of 13 June 2007); further
references to case law in Jäger/Schweiter (fn 74) 105 ff.
162 Unpublished Federal Court decision 4C.53/2000 of 13 June 2000, at para 2.c. See
Hausheer (fn 155) 201, 217.
163 Cf BGE 119 II 305 f (Federal Court decision of 17 August 1993).
164 See, eg, Sutter-Somm/Spitz (fn 154) 143, 155. For references to case law, see Jäger/Schweiter
(fn 74) 106 ff.
165 See supra, no 51 and infra, no 90.
166 See Jäger/Schweiter (fn 74) 108 ff.
167 Supra, no 56.
168 On the doctrine of loss of a chance, see infra, no 63.
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60 Under orthodox rules of causation, a person who has suffered damage
must also prove the identity of the person who caused such damage.169 If a
person is unable to prove the identity of the tortfeasor, liability will fail.
This also holds true in case of alternative causation, ie where it is estab-
lished that the damage must have been caused by one of several tortfea-
sors, but it is impossible to prove which one.170 However, if such tortfea-
sors acted in concert within the meaning of art 50(1) CO, an exception is
made and they will be jointly and severally liable.171
61 A further exception may apply where the requirements of art 55(1) CO172
are met, although the Federal Court has not yet been called on to decide
this issue in a medical context. Thus, if it is established that a member of a
certain group of persons must have caused the damage in the course of
their work, and all of the group members are subordinated to one and the
same ‘master’, such master should be held liable if he is unable to prove
that he took all precautions necessary to prevent the damage.173 In this
situation, the damaged party should not be required to establish the
identity of the person who actually caused the damage.174 Rather, liability
should turn on the issue of subordination and on the master’s (in-)ability
to prove that he took all necessary precautions to prevent such harm, in
particular with respect to an appropriate organisation.175 Nonetheless, the
patient will need to prove that his damage was caused by a member of the
group (and not by a third person). If the patient alleges that his harm was
caused by a mistake in treatment, he will also need to prove such mistake,
and that such mistake caused his damage.176
62 Accordingly, if it is established that the harm was caused eg by a member
of a hospital’s staff, without the identity of such staff member being
known, the patient may bring a claim against the hospital under art 55(1)
169 See Kuhn (fn 154) 601, 653 f.
170 This is probably still the majority opinion in Swiss law (see, eg, Brehm [fn 97] art 41 no
124 ff), although there is an increasing number of critics (see, eg, Rey [fn 137] paras 623,
624; for further references, see Schnyder [fn 96] art 41 no 25).
171 See Rey (fn 137) paras 625 ff; Brehm (fn 97) art 50 no 6 ff. On joint and several liability,
see infra, no 66.
172 See supra, nos 48 ff.
173 Cf supra, no 50.
174 Opinion shared by Rey (fn 137) para 898; H Honsell, Schweizerisches Haftpflichtrecht
(4th edn 2005) § 13 no 21. See alsoWerro, La responsabilité civile (2005) para 456.
175 The only published federal case discussing (and accepting) liability for organisational
deficiencies in a medical context is concerned with cantonal public law: see BGE 112 Ib
322 (Federal Court decision of 30 September 1986); see also infra, no 100. However, the
Federal Court has applied similar reasoning in product liability cases: see BGE 110 II
456 (Federal Court decision of 9 October 1984).
176 See supra, nos 54, 56, and 57.
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CO. In such a case, the hospital should be held liable unless it is able to
prove that it took all necessary precautions to prevent such harm, in
particular with respect to an appropriate organisation. The patient should
only be required to prove the identity of the individual who actually
caused the harm if he wishes to bring a claim against such individual.177
12. Loss of a chance
63In 2007, the Swiss Federal Court was called upon for the first time to
decide whether a cantonal court’s refusal to impose liability for loss of a
chance was arbitrary.178 The scope of the Federal Court’s review was
limited to the question of arbitrariness as the cantonal court’s decision
was based on cantonal public law, and not on federal private law, where
the scope of review would have been broader. Cantonal public law was at
issue as the patient had been treated in a cantonal public hospital.179
Although the situation under federal private law has not yet been decided
by the Federal Court, the Court did indicate that it considered the loss of
chance theory to be problematic.180 As such, it is unlikely to recognise this
theory under federal private law in the near future.181
13. Multiple persons involved
64Where more than one individual is involved in the provision of medical
services to the patient, several different situations must be distinguished
with regard to liability in tort:
65In the first scenario, all individuals involved in the provision of medical
services are employed by one and the same ‘master’. As pointed out above,
177 This view was also taken by the Amtsgericht Luzern-Stadt, decision of 26 June 1993,
SG N 895, at para 7.2. Opinion shared by TM Mannsdorfer, Haftung für perinatale
Schädigung im medizinischen Bereich, HAVE 2003, 101, 110; J Gross, Haftung für
medizinische Behandlung im Privatrecht und im öffentlichen Recht der Schweiz
(1987) 251 f; cf also Kuhn (fn 154) 601, 654, who is, however, more reserved in his
analysis of the situation de lege lata.
178 BGE 133 III 462 (Federal Court decision of 13 June 2007). See C Widmer, A Civil
Lawyer’s Introduction to Anglo-American Law: Torts (2008) 266 ff.
179 See infra, no 96.
180 This sceptical attitude was confirmed in the unpublished Federal Court decision
4A.227/2007 of 26 September 2007.
181 For a discussion of this case, see C Müller, Hat die perte d’une chance in der Schweiz
noch eine Chance? – BGE 133 III 462, ZBJV 2007, 862 ff.
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a ‘master’ may be liable in tort for its ‘servants’ under art 55(1) CO.182 The
master-servant relationship turns on the requirement of subordination.183
Employees are generally considered to be subordinated to their employers
for the purposes of art 55(1) CO.184 Thus, a hospital is ‘master’ in relation
to its employees, be they chief physicians, senior physicians, interns,
nurses, members of the internal legal department, accountants, or clean-
ing staff. Although persons lower down in the hospital hierarchy will
receive their instructions from, and be supervised by, intermediate staff
members, it is always the person at the top of the hierarchy, ie the hospital
itself that will qualify as ‘master’ in relation to lower staff members, not
the intermediate staff.185
66 If something goes wrong in this comparatively straightforward scenario,
the hospital will be liable in tort toward the patient under art 55(1) CO,
unless it can show that it took all necessary precautions to avoid the
damage, in particular with respect to an appropriate organisation.186 If the
patient is able to identify the individual staff member(s) who actually
caused the harm,187 he may also choose to sue such individual(s) instead
under art 41(1) CO,188 although this will generally be the less attractive
route for the patient due to the hospital’s ‘deeper pockets’. Liability of the
hospital and the responsible staff member(s) is joint and several (Solidarität/
solidarité/solidarietà),189 so that the patient may choose whether to bring a
claim in an individual action against one of the responsible parties, for all or
only part of his damages, or against all liable parties in a joint action.190
67 In the second, more complex scenario, one or more affiliated doctors
(Belegarzt/médecin agréé) are involved in the provision of medical services to
the patient, together with hospital staff members. As before, if the patient is
able to identify the individual(s) who actually caused the harm, he may
bring a claim against such individual under art 41(1) CO. However, it may
be difficult to establish the identity of such individual, or such individual’s
pockets may not be ‘deep’ enough. The question then arises whether the
182 Supra, nos 48 ff.
183 See supra, no 48.
184 But see infra, nos 67 ff, on the situation with respect to hospital staff assisting an
affiliated doctor.
185 See generally K Oftinger/EW Stark, Schweizerisches Haftpflichtrecht, Band II/1 (4th edn
1987) § 20 no 73, 79; Rey (fn 137) para 905;Werro (fn 174) para 450.
186 See supra, nos 50 and 61 f.
187 On this condition, see supra, nos 60 ff.
188 On the requirements under art 41(1) CO, see supra, no 47.
189 Art 51 CO (fn 98).
190 Art 144(1) CO (fn 98). See alsoMannsdorfer, HAVE 2003, 101, 117.
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individuals involved in the provision of medical services to the patient are
subordinated to a ‘master’ for the purposes of art 55(1) CO, and if so, who
that ‘master’ is.
68First of all, the affiliated physician himself is not subordinated to the
hospital, and accordingly, the hospital cannot be held liable for any of the
affiliated doctor’s mistakes.191 However, the situation is less clear if a
mistake is made by a member of the hospital staff. Although staff mem-
bers are employed by the hospital, there are situations where the affiliated
doctor, and not the hospital, will be classified as ‘master’ under art 55(1)
CO. Thus, the affiliated doctor will qualify as ‘master’ if the mistake
occurred in a phase where the responsible staff member was subject to
the affiliated doctor’s supervision and authority to issue directives, for
example whilst assisting during an operation under the affiliated doctor’s
guidance. In contrast, the hospital will qualify as ‘master’ if a mistake is
made by a staff member in an area where such member is subject to the
hospital’s supervision and authority to issue directives, for example whilst
taking care of the patient prior to the affiliated doctor’s arrival.192
69Once the ‘master’ is identified in this second scenario, he will be liable
toward the patient under art 55(1) CO unless he can show that he took all
necessary precautions to avoid the damage.193 If the patient is able to
identify the individual(s) who actually caused the harm, he may also
choose to sue such individual(s) under art 41(1) CO. Liability of the master
and the responsible individual(s) is joint and several.194
70Where several specialist doctors are on an operating team together, they
will generally not be subordinated to one another for the purposes of art
55(1) CO. However, this will depend on the structure and organisation of
the specific team.195 If all of the specialists are employed by one and the
same hospital, such hospital will qualify as the ‘master’ under art 55(1)
CO.196
191 Mannsdorfer, HAVE 2003, 101, 117.
192 See ibid, 101, 117; cf also C Götz Staehelin, Teamarbeit und geteilte Verantwortung in
Spital, Arztpraxis und Belegarztverhältnis, HAVE 2007, 226, 233.
193 See supra, no 50.
194 Cf already supra, no 66.
195 See Götz Staehelin, HAVE 2007, 226, 233.
196 On this straightforward scenario, see supra, no 65.
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14. Strict liability
71 Under federal private law, strict liability of private hospitals, private
practitioners or other health care providers is available only in very
restricted situations. Strict liability under cantonal public law will be dealt
with separately.197
72 If a patient is harmed by a defective product, such as a drug, medical
device or technical equipment,198 the producer of such product may
become liable toward the patient under the federal Product Liability
Act.199 A health care provider may qualify as a ‘producer’ in case of
activities such as the preparation of medical products (eg sterilisation of
unsterile medical products).200 Moreover, any health care provider who
imports a product for commercial distribution in Switzerland is consid-
ered a ‘producer’ under the Act.201 The Act is based on the EC directive of 5
July 1985. Liability under the Act is strict. Accordingly, the producer may
be held liable regardless of fault.202
73 Anymoveable thing, including those things which form a component part
of another moveable thing or of an immoveable thing, constitutes a
‘product’ under the Act.203 Other than drugs, medical devices and techni-
cal equipment, blood and human organs also constitute products once
they have been separated from the body and prepared.204
74 Other than the fact that liability under the Act is strict, product liability law
also deviates from general tort rules with regard to the statute of limita-
tions. Thus, claims brought under the Act are time-barred three years from
the day the harmed person acquired – or should have acquired – knowledge
of the damage, the defect and the producer’s identity.205 Moreover, liability
under the Act cannot be limited or excluded.206
197 See infra, nos 95 ff.
198 On the meaning of ‘defective’ in the medical context, see M Gattiker, Arzt und
Medizinprodukt, in: Fellmann/Poledna (fn 107) 495, 526 ff.
199 See art 2 of the Federal Product Liability Act (PLA) (Bundesgesetz über die Produktehaft-
pflicht [Produktehaftpflichtgesetz, PrHG]) of 18 June 1993, SR 221.112.944.
200 See Gattiker (fn 198) 495, 525 ff.
201 Cf art 2(1)(c) PLA (fn 199); see Gattiker (fn 198) 495, 526.
202 See, eg, Rey (fn 137) paras 1167 ff.
203 Art 3 PLA (fn 199).
204 W Fellmann in: Honsell et al (fn 96) art 3 PrHG no 4; Honsell (fn 174) § 21 no 29. Special
rules apply to liability for harm caused by xenotransplants; see arts 3(2)(b) and 5(1bis)
PLA (fn 199).
205 Art 9 PLA (fn 199). On the one-year period under the general statute of limitations
(art 60 CO), which only starts to run in case of actual knowledge, see supra, no 53.
206 Art 8 PLA (fn 199).
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75Strict liability may also be available in the case of clinical drug trials.
Under federal law, clinical drug trials may only be conducted if it is
ensured that test persons will be fully compensated for any damage
suffered in the course of the trial.207 Although the wording of federal law
is not unequivocal and its meaning has not yet been clarified by the
Federal Court, such liability is generally considered to be strict.208 It has
also been suggested that the standard of proof with regard to causation is
relaxed as the test person is only required to show that harm was suffered
‘in the course of the clinical trial’.209 As under the Product Liability Act, it
is argued that liability in case of clinical drug trials cannot be limited or
excluded.210 However, many questions remain open.211
76In a certain sense, liability for failure to obtain informed consent as devel-
oped by the Federal Court can also be considered strict,212 as the doctor who
proceeds without such consent will become liable for all damage suffered in
consequence of the medical intervention, including damage which was
caused simply by chance, as long as such damage is not too remote.213
C. Contractual Liability
15. Basics of contracts in the health care sector
77If a patient with the capacity to act seeks medical advice or treatment from
a private practitioner, a private hospital or other private health care
provider, such patient will, as a rule,214 enter into a private law contract
with such provider. Private law contracts for provision of medical services
are traditionally classified as a mandate (Auftrag/mandat/mandato).215 This
207 Art 54(1)(a)(5) and (1)(b) DMPA (fn 104) in conjunction with art 7(2) CTR (fn 104).
208 See D Sprumont/M-L Béguin, La nouvelle réglementation des essais cliniques de médica-
ments, SÄZ No 18/2002, 894, 900; O Guillod/P Schweizer, Expérimentation de nouveaux
médicaments et responsabilité civile, in: P Tercier (ed), Aspects de droit médical (1987)
93; J Gross, Staatshaftung und Heilmittelrecht, leges 1/2003, 137, 138; D Sprumont/
S Boillat/H Amstad, Essais cliniques, responsabilité civile et contrats d’assurance, SÄZ
No. 40/2002, 2092, 2093; Gattiker (fn 198) 495, 519.
209 Sprumont/Béguin, SÄZ No 18/2002, 894, 900.
210 Ibid, 894, 899, 900.
211 See Gattiker (fn 198) 495, 519 f, with further references.
212 See Guillod (fn 87) 392, 399 (at para 26).
213 See infra, no 90.
214 For the exceptions to this rule, see supra, no 45.
215 Arts 394 ff CO (fn 98). See, eg, BGE 132 III 359, 362 f (Federal Court decision of 20
December 2005); W Fellmann, Die Haftung des Privatarztes und des Privatspitals, in:
Fellmann/Poledna (fn 107) 47, 49 ff; id (fn 111) 103, 106;Guillod (fn 87) 392, 393 (at para 3).
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also applies to contracts between patients and private hospitals, at least
insofar as the provision of care and medical services (and not, eg, catering)
is concerned.216
78 In the case of stationary medical care in a private hospital, two different
scenarios must be distinguished.217 In the first, the patient enters into
only one contract, namely with the hospital. Under this so-called ‘com-
prehensive hospital contract’ (totaler Spitalaufnahmevertrag/contrat global
d’hospitalisation), the hospital is contractually bound to provide the patient
with accommodation, catering, care and medical treatment, and the
patient is contractually bound to remunerate such services. Accordingly,
if something goes wrong in the course of medical treatment, a contractual
claim for medical malpractice can only be brought directly against the
hospital. The responsible doctor will be considered an auxiliary of the
hospital under art 101(1) CO, so that his acts or omissions will be imputed
to the hospital for the purposes of liability.218 If the patient wishes to sue
the responsible doctor, he may do so; in this case, hospital and doctor will
be jointly and severally liable.219 However, as the patient only has a
contract with the hospital and not with the doctor, any claim against the
doctor will of necessity be a tort claim.220
79 In the second scenario, the patient also enters into a contract with the
hospital. However, the hospital is only contractually bound to provide the
patient with accommodation, catering, and care (so-called ‘fractioned hospi-
tal contract’; gespaltener Spitalaufnahmevertrag/contrat partiel d’hospitalisation). In
contrast, medical treatment is provided on the basis of a separate contract
between the patient and the doctor who is treating the patient in the
hospital.221 Accordingly, if something goes wrong in the course of treatment,
the question will arise whether the measure which caused the harm was
within the remit of the hospital or the doctor. Whether or not a contractual
claim can be brought against the hospital or the doctor in this second scenario
will depend on the outcome of this assessment.222 The doctor’s acts and
216 Fellmann (fn 111) 103, 106, 107.
217 See Guillod (fn 87) 392, 393 (at para 5); Fellmann (fn 111) 103, 106 f;M Amstutz/W Schluep
in: Honsell et al (fn 96) Einl vor art 184 ff no 343 ff.
218 See infra, no 85.
219 Art 51 CO (fn 98). On the consequences of joint and several liability, see supra, no 66.
220 Fellmann (fn 215) 47, 51; Amstutz/Schluep (fn 217) Einleitung vor art 184 ff no 355.
221 Fellmann (fn 215) 47, 51.
222 See Amtsgericht Luzern-Stadt, decision of 26 June 1993, SGN 895, at para 7.2; Gross (fn
177) 249 f, 254 ff; see also Amstutz/Schluep (fn 217) Einl vor art 184 ff no 356; Fellmann
(fn 111) 103, 107.
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omissions cannot be imputed to the hospital under art 101(1) CO,223 as the
hospital is not contractually bound to provide medical treatment.
80If a patient is treated in a public hospital, the relationship between
hospital and patient will be subject to public law.224 If the patient is a
private patient of one of the hospital’s doctors, such patient will also enter
into a private law contract with such doctor.225 Nonetheless, it does not
necessarily follow that hospital doctors will become personally liable
toward their private patients if something goes wrong during treatment,
as the Cantons have the power to preempt federal private law with regard
to the liability of their employees.226
81In general, the social health system has no impact on the relationship
between patients and health care providers.227 However, an exception
applies with regard to the question of who is bound to pay the health care
provider’s fees. In the case of social health insurance coverage, the rule is
that the patient will pay the health care provider’s fees directly. The patient
will then be entitled to reimbursement from the insurer (so-called tiers
garant-system). Nonetheless, insurers and health care providers may deviate
from this rule by agreeing that the insurer, and not the patient, will be the
health care provider’s debtor (so-called tiers payant-system).228 Also, where a
patient requires stationary care, the rule is reversed under federal law, so
that the health care insurer will always be the health care provider’s
debtor.229 In the case of social accident insurance coverage, the health care
provider’s debtor is generally the insurer, and not the patient.230
16. Differences to tort law
82Under art 97(1) of the Code of Obligations (CO),231 four requirements must
be met for liability in contract. Firstly, a person must have suffered
damage, ie a pecuniary loss. Secondly, there must be a breach of contract.
Thirdly, there must be a causal link between the breach and the damage
223 Cf infra, no 85.
224 See infra, no 96.
225 The same apples if the public hospital allows for medical treatment by affiliated
doctors; see Fellmann (fn 111) 103, 110 ff.
226 See infra, no 97 and the references in fn 280.
227 See supra, no 24.
228 See art 42 HIA (fn 6).
229 Art 42(2) HIA (fn 6).
230 Gächter/Vollenweider (fn 5) para 732.
231 See supra, fn 98.
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suffered, ie the breach must be a conditio sine qua non of the damage, and
such damage must not be too remote.232 Finally, the potentially liable
party must be at fault, ie hemust be of sufficient mental capacity andmust
have acted either intentionally or negligently. These requirements also
apply to contracts for the provision of medical treatment.233
83 If the requirements for both contractual and tort liability are met, patients
who are harmed in the course of medical treatment are free to choose
whether to bring their claim in contract or in tort.234 However, contractual
claims are generally more advantageous.235 Thus, the statute of limita-
tions for contractual claims is ten years from the date on which the claim
was due,236 whereas in tort, the regular limitation period is one year from
the day the harmed person acquired knowledge of the damage and the
tortfeasor’s identity.237
84 A further distinction between claims in contract and tort relates to the
burden of proof with regard to fault. In tort claims, it is the harmed party
who must prove that the alleged tortfeasor acted intentionally or negli-
gently, whereas in contract claims, the burden of proof is shifted to the
party in breach under art 97(1) CO. Unless such party succeeds in showing
that he bears no fault, such fault will be presumed for the purposes of
liability. However, where medical malpractice is concerned, this advan-
tage has little practical impact.238 In a contractual claim for medical
malpractice, the patient must prove that the health care provider breached
the contract by violating professional standards, ie by not acting lege
artis.239 If the patient succeeds in proving such breach, it will be practically
impossible for the health care provider to free himself from liability by
showing that he was not at fault. Accordingly, the central question is
whether the health care provider breached the contract, and that is for the
patient to prove.240 In tort claims, an alleged violation of professional
standards must also be proved by the patient, namely in the context of
wrongfulness.241 Both in tort and in contract claims, the requisite stand-
232 For the corresponding requirements in tort law, see supra, no 47.
233 See, eg, BGE 133 III 121, 123 ff (Federal Court decision of 9 February 2007).
234 See, eg, I Schwenzer, Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht Allgemeiner Teil (5th edn 2009)
para 5.03.
235 See, eg, Schwenzer (fn 234) para 5.04.
236 Art 127 in conjunction with art 130(1) CO (fn 98).
237 See supra, no 53.
238 See generallyWerro (fn 174) para 1481.
239 See, eg, BGE 133 III 121, 124 (Federal Court decision of 9 February 2007).
240 See, eg, BGE 133 III 121, 126–127 (Federal Court decision of 9 February 2007).
241 See supra, no 54.
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ard of care is the same.242 As in tort, a doctor is also liable in contract for
any fault, regardless of the degree.243
85Another difference between contractual and tort liability is that a debtor’s
contractual responsibility for auxiliaries is more far-reaching than in tort
law, and thus more advantageous to the claimant. Unlike in tort, where a
relationship of ‘subordination’ is required,244 acts and omissions of an
auxiliary are generally imputed to the debtor under art 101(1) CO, as long
as the auxiliary’s conduct can be classified as a breach of contract.245 Any
person acting with a view to executing the debtor’s contractual obliga-
tions with the debtor’s consent and knowledge qualifies as an auxiliary for
the purposes of liability, including independent third parties.246 More-
over, the debtor cannot escape liability by showing that he exercised all
due diligence.247 Neither the debtor’s nor the auxiliary’s fault is required
for liability; rather, it is sufficient that the debtor would have been at fault
had he acted in the same way as the auxiliary (so-called ‘hypothetical
fault’).248 It is for the debtor to prove that the auxiliary complied with the
standard of care owed by the debtor.249
86Insofar as the patient’s claims are concerned, the same types of damages are
compensable both in tort and in contract. Claims for non-pecuniary loss are
also available both in tort and in contract.250 However, damages claims by
the victim’s relatives for wrongful death can only be based in tort, not in
contract.251 In principle,252 this also applies to claims for non-pecuniary loss
brought by a disabled victim’s relatives, as well as to independent claims for
non-pecuniary loss brought by a deceased victim’s relatives.253
242 BGE 115 Ib 175, 810 (Federal Court decision of 17 May 1989).
243 See BGE 133 III 121, 124 (Federal Court decision of 9 February 2007); cf also supra, no
47 in fine.
244 Art 55(1) CO; see supra, no 48.
245 See Schwenzer (fn 234) paras 23.07 ff.
246 See, eg, ibid, para 23.04.
247 Contrast art 55(1) CO; see supra no 50.
248 See, eg, Schwenzer (fn 234) para 23.10; for an example from case law, see Amtsgericht
Luzern-Stadt, decision of 26 June 1993, SG N 895, at paras 6.2 ff (liability of a hospital
for acts of its auxiliaries).
249 See P Gauch/W Schluep/S Emmenegger, Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht vol 2 (9th edn
2008) para 3049; unpublished Federal Court decision 4C.307/2003 of 19 February
2004, at para 5.2; BGE 119 II 337, 338 (Federal Court decision of 22 June 1993).
250 Cf BGE 123 III 204, 206–207 (Federal Court decision of 9 June 1997).
251 BGE 123 III 204, 207 (Federal Court decision of 9 June 1997).
252 See infra, no 137.
253 BGE 123 III 204, 213 (Federal Court decision of 9 June 1997). On the practical
consequences, see infra, no 137.
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17. Contractual claims in the absence of direct contracts?
87 In certain limited circumstances, a patient who has not entered into a
contract with a health care provider may nonetheless be able to base a
claim on the violation of contractual duties. If, for example, a patient lacks
the capacity to act, he cannot conclude a contract for the provision of
medical services on his own behalf. Rather, his legal guardian must act for
him. Depending on the circumstances of the case,254 the legal guardian
will either act as the patient’s agent, so that the contract will be concluded
directly between the health care provider and the patient, or the contract
will be concluded between the health care provider and the legal guardian.
In the latter case, the patient is not a party to the contract. Nonetheless, if
something goes wrong in the course of medical treatment, the patient will
have a contractual claim against the health care provider, as the contract
was entered into for the patient’s benefit.255
88 In contrast, the concept of contracts with protective effect for third parties
(Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung zugunsten Dritter/contrat avec effet protecteur envers
des tiers/contratto con effetto di protezione a favore di terzi) has not hitherto been
adopted by the Federal Court256 and remains controversial in Swiss law.257
Accordingly, it is doubtful whether a patient basing his claim on a
violation of the contract between (eg) the hospital and the doctor would
be successful.
18. Informed consent
89 The doctrine of informed consent can become relevant both in tort and in
contract claims for medical malpractice. As pointed out above,258 a patient
alleging medical malpractice must prove that the medical treatment was
not lege artis, which can be difficult. Both in contract and in tort, however,
it is the doctor (or, if the hospital’s liability is at issue, the hospital) who
must prove that the patient gave informed consent.259
254 See Schwenzer (fn 234) paras 86.11 f.
255 See art 112(2) CO (fn 98). Cf BGE 116 II 519, 520 (Federal Court decision of 23 October
1990); Schwenzer (fn 234) para 86.11.
256 Question left open in BGE 130 III 345, 347–348 (Federal Court decision of 23
December 2003).
257 See Schwenzer (fn 234) paras 87.01 ff.
258 Supra, nos 51 (for tort claims) and 84 (for contract claims).
259 For tort claims, see supra, para 51; for contract claims, see BGE 133 III 121, 129
(Federal Court decision of 9 February 2007).
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90Swiss law not only recognises medical malpractice in its narrower sense,
but also a distinct cause of action for failure to obtain informed consent.260
If something goes wrong during a medical intervention and it cannot be
shown that the patient gave his informed consent, the consequences are
drastic. The doctor will be held liable for all damage suffered in conse-
quence of the intervention, regardless of whether such damage was caused
by a mistake in treatment or simply by chance, as long as such damage is
not too remote.261 He may only avoid liability if he can show that the
individual patient would have consented to the intervention even if he
had been properly informed (so-called ‘hypothetical consent’).262 If he
fails, the patient will only be required to show that he suffered damage
as a consequence of the intervention (eg surgery) as such.263 This will
generally be an easy task. Accordingly, questions surrounding informed
consent are of great practical importance, and it is the rule, rather than the
exception, that a patient will allege lack of informed consent in medical
malpractice cases.264
91The legal requirements of informed consent have been developed in case
law, although there are statutory rules in particularly sensitive areas, such
as reproductive medicine, organ transplantation or genetic testing.265
Informed consent also forms one of the cornerstones of the Oviedo Con-
vention on Human Rights and Biomedicine.266 Cantonal law may provide
additional statutory rules on the scope of the duty to inform.267 The Swiss
Medical Association’s rules of professional conduct268 also provide that
doctors must inform their patients,269 as do various guidelines of the Swiss
Academy of Medical Sciences (SAMW).270
260 See, eg, Hausheer (fn 155) 201, 212.
261 See, eg, BGE 108 II 59, 62 (Federal Court decision of 12 January 1982); BGE 133 III 121,
128 (Federal Court decision of 9 February 2007). See also Guillod (fn 87) 392, 398 (at
para 23). On the test of remoteness in contract and tort claims, see supra, nos 47 and 82.
262 See, eg, BGE 133 III 121, 130 (Federal Court decision of 9 February 2007); unpublished
Federal Court decision 4.C.66/2007 of 9 January 2008, at para 5; Hausheer (fn 155) 201,
209 f; Fellmann (fn 111) 103, 227 ff. For further references to case law, see Jäger/Schweiter
(fn 74) 86 ff.
263 See, eg, BGE 108 II 59, 62–63 (Federal Court decision of 12 January 1982).
264 See, eg, Guillod (fn 87) 392, 399 (at para 26). For a critique of this development, see
Roberto (fn 143) paras 93 ff; Honsell (fn 174) § 5 no 22.
265 See Guillod (fn 87) 392, 398 (at para 24); Fellmann (fn 111) 103, 182 ff.
266 See arts 5–9 of the Oviedo Convention (Übereinkommen zum Schutz der Menschenrechte und
der Menschenwürde im Hinblick auf die Anwendung von Biologie und Medizin [Übereinkommen
über Menschenrechte und Biomedizin]) of 4 April 1997, SR 0.810.2.
267 See Jäger/Schweiter (fn 74) 68, 69.
268 See supra, no 38.
269 See art 10 (fn 114).
270 On the guidelines of the SAMW, see supra, no 39.
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92 The purpose of informed consent is to provide adequate information to
the patient so that he can make an intelligent decision about a given
diagnostic or therapeutic procedure. The scope of the duty to inform
patients depends on the nature and the possible consequences of the
medical treatment involved.271 In broad terms, the patient should receive
all the information necessary for him to be able to decide whether or not to
agree to the proposed intervention. The individual patient’s information
needs are decisive, not those of a ‘reasonable’ patient.272 Information must
be given early enough for the patient to be able to reach a decision without
pressure. In the case of heavy surgery or if grave risks are involved, a
patient must be informed at least three days beforehand, unless there is an
emergency. Otherwise, one day beforehand is sufficient.273
93 In particular,274 doctors are under a duty to inform their patients of the
nature of the proposed treatment and the risks involved, except in case of
commonplace measures which neither pose a serious threat to the pa-
tient’s health nor may lead to irrevocable harm or long-term impairment.
There is no duty to inform of risks which are generally involved with all
larger interventions, such as bleeding, infections, thrombosis or embo-
lisms. In contrast, the patient must be informed of specific risks of the
proposed intervention, as well as of rare risks with serious consequences.
In general, statistical risk percentages are not used for determining the
scope of the duty to inform.275
94 The doctrine of informed consent is limited by the so-called ‘therapeutic
privilege’, meaning that a doctor need not (and indeed must not) give
information whichmight induce a state of anxiety in the patient such as to
injure the patient’s health.276
271 See Fellmann (fn 111) 103, 167 ff; Hausheer (fn 155) 201, 203 ff.
272 SeeW Wiegand, Die Aufklärungspflicht und die Folgen ihrer Verletzung, in: H Honsell
(ed), Handbuch des Arztrechts (1994) 119, 136 ff; Fellmann (fn 111) 103, 179.
273 See unpublished Federal Court decision 4P.265/2002 of 28 April 2003, at para 5.2;
Guillod (fn 87) 392, 399 (at para 25).
274 For references to pertinent case law, see Jäger/Schweiter (fn 74) 76 ff; see also Fellmann (fn
111) 103, 173 ff, 178 ff; Wiegand (fn 272) 119, 127 ff, 134 ff; Hausheer (fn 155) 201, 205
ff; Guillod (fn 87) 392, 397 (at paras 19 ff).
275 On this latter issue, seeWiegand (fn 272) 119, 134 f; Fellmann (fn 111) 103, 180, 181.
276 For references to case law, see Jäger/Schweiter (fn 74) 76.
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D. Public Liability
19. Key differences from cases involving private hospitals or
doctors
95Where a patient is injured in a public hospital, the first question which
arises relates to the law governing (1) the relationship between the patient
and the hospital (or, where the hospital does not have an independent
legal personality, with the hospital proprietor), and (2) the relationship
between the patient and the hospital’s employees, in particular its doctors.
96The liability of public legal entities in Switzerland is not governed by
federal private law, but by federal public law (in the case of federal entities)
or cantonal public law (in the case of cantonal entities).277 With a very few
exceptions,278 public hospitals in Switzerland are either cantonal or muni-
cipal. Accordingly, the liability of such hospitals (or, where applicable, the
hospital proprietor) is governed by the respective Canton’s public law.
According to the majority opinion, this also applies in cases of privatisa-
tion.279
97As far as the relationship between a patient and the public hospital’s
employees, including hospital doctors, is concerned, the Cantons are free
to deviate from the liability regime under federal private law by subjecting
such persons’ liability to cantonal public law. This power to preempt federal
private law also extends to a doctor’s relationship with his private pa-
tients.280
98If the Cantons do not make use of this power, the provisions of federal
private law will apply by default, so that a hospital doctor may become
liable toward a patient under the provisions of the Swiss Code of Obliga-
tions.281 Accordingly, the liability of doctors employed by a public hospital
may be governed by federal private law or by cantonal public law, depend-
ing on the legislation of the Canton where the hospital is located.282 To date,
277 Art 59 CC (fn 153).
278 See Guillod (fn 87) 392, 402 (at para 38).
279 On this and on other instances where cantonal public law might apply, see supra,
no 45.
280 See, eg, BGE 122 III 101, 104–105 (Federal Court decision of 11 March 1996); Guillod
(fn 87) 392, 408 (at paras 62 ff); Gross (fn 131) 35, 36 f; Fellmann (fn 111) 103, 111. For
further references to case law, see Jäger/Schweiter (fn 74) 12 ff.
281 See fn 98.
282 See, eg, Fellmann (fn 111) 103, 112 ff; Eichenberger (fn 74) 351, 359. For an overview of
the pertinent decisions of the Swiss Federal Court, see Jäger/Schweiter (fn 74) 4 ff. On
liability under federal private law, see supra, nos 45 ff and nos 77 ff.
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all Cantons have made use of their power to legislate in this area.283
Although each of the 26 Swiss Cantons has its own distinct public law,
most cantonal liability regimes are similar.
99 Liability under cantonal public law may differ in several ways from the
liability regime under federal private law. The majority of Cantons pro-
vide for the exclusive liability of the State, meaning that any claims for
pecuniary or non-pecuniary loss may only be brought against the State,
and not against the responsible State employee. The Canton may have a
right of recourse against the responsible employee, but this is generally
restricted to cases where such employee caused the damage intentionally
or through gross negligence.284
100 In most Swiss cantons, fault is not a requirement for State liability.285 In
particular, this means that the Canton cannot avoid liability by showing
that it exercised all due diligence in selecting, instructing and overseeing
its employees and that all work processes were organised diligently.286
Accordingly, a patient will not have to identify the actual tortfeasor in
claims against the Canton.287 The Federal Court has also accepted liability
for organisational deficiencies under cantonal public law.288
101 However, the Canton will only be liable for acts which are wrongful
(widerrechtlich/illicite/illecito). The notion of ‘wrongfulness’ corresponds to
that which is used in federal private law. Accordingly, any interference
with a patient’s physical integrity constitutes wrongfulness, so that the
Canton will have to prove that the patient gave his informed consent.289 If
this can be proved, the intervention will only be considered wrongful if
the patient can show that the intervention was not lege artis.290 As far as the
283 Gross (fn 131) 35 f.
284 See, eg, §§ 6(1), 6(4) and 15(1) of the Public Liability Act of the Canton of Zurich
(Haftungsgesetz) of 14 September 1969, accessible at <http://www.zhlex.zh.ch>
(12.01.11); §§ 3(1), 3(2) and 9 of the Public Liability Act of the Canton of Basel-Stadt
(Gesetz über die Haftung des Staates und seines Personals [Haftungsgesetz, HG]) of 17 Novem-
ber 1999, accessible at <http://www.gesetzessammlung.bs.ch> (12.01.11); see also
Gross (fn 131) 35, 37; Guillod (fn 87) 392, 404 (at para 44).
285 See Guillod (fn 87) 392, 404 (at paras 47 ff) for references to cantonal law.
286 Contrast art 55(1) CO (see supra, no 50).
287 Cf Gross (fn 131) 35, 39 ff; Kuhn (fn 154) 601, 654; see also the references in fn 177,
supra.
288 BGE 112 Ib 322 (Federal Court decision of 30 September 1986). On the unclear
situation in federal tort law, see supra, nos 61 f.
289 See supra, no 51.
290 See, eg, BGE 123 II 577, 583 (Federal Court decision of 12 September 1997) with
further references.
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burden of proof is concerned, the situation of the patient is no different
from that under (federal) tort and contract law.
102Claims brought under cantonal public law are subject to the respective
Canton’s statute of limitations, which may differ from the limitation
periods provided under federal private law.291
103Finally, the nature of the law governing liability (ie federal private law or
cantonal public law) can also have an impact on jurisdiction and proce-
dural rules. Cantonal courts with jurisdiction to hear civil cases do not
necessarily have jurisdiction over cases governed by public law, and
different procedural rules apply to civil law and public law cases. How-
ever, most cantonal laws provide that public liability claims fall within the
jurisdiction of civil law courts, and accordingly, the laws on civil proce-
dure will apply.292 Until recently, each Canton had its own distinct laws on
civil procedure. However, on 1 January 2011, the different cantonal laws
were replaced by the new Federal Act on Civil Procedure.293
E. Alternative compensation regimes
20. Funds and/or other alternative compensation regimes
104There are currently no funds or alternative compensation regimes offering
compensation (in whole or in part) to victims of medical malpractice. A
proposal to introduce a private compensation fund was made in 2002294
but has not been implemented to date.
291 See Guillod (fn 87) 392, 409 (at para 68). On the general limitation period in federal tort
law, see supra, no 53.
292 See, eg, § 19 of the Public Liability Act of the Canton of Zurich (fn 284); § 6(1) of the
Public Liability Act of the Canton of Basel-Stadt (fn 284); see also J Gross, Schweize-
risches Staatshaftungsrecht (2nd edn 2001) 143, 361; Guillod (fn 87) 392, 413 (at para
84); T Jaag, Öffentliches Entschädigungsrecht: Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede
zwischen verschiedenen Formen öffentlichrechtlicher Entschädigungen, Schweize-
risches Zentralblatt für Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht (ZBL) 1997, 145, 166 f.
293 See supra, no 8.
294 Joint proposal by the Swiss Society for Health Care Policy (SGGP/SSPS), the Swiss
Medical Association (FMH), the Red Cross and the journal ‘Beobachter’; see Guillod (fn
154) 155, 169.
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F. Extent of Liability/Remedies
I. Pecuniary loss
21. Introduction to indemnifying pecuniary loss
105 The general principle in Swiss law is that the tortfeasor is liable for all
pecuniary loss caused by the tortious act, as long as such damage is not too
remote.295 The aim of compensation for pecuniary loss is to place the
injured person in the position in which he would have been had the
tortious event not occurred.296 Punitive damages are not available.297
106 The person claiming compensation must prove that he has suffered
pecuniary loss, and quantify such loss.298 If it is impossible to prove or
quantify the loss, the court may use its discretion to determine the loss,
giving due consideration to the ‘ordinary course of things’ (gewöhnlicher
Lauf der Dinge/cours ordinaire des choses/ordinario andamento delle cose) and the
measures taken by the injured person.299 Such difficulties of proof are
typical of claims for future pecuniary loss.
107 It is in the court’s discretion to decide whether the pecuniary loss suffered
by a claimant shall be compensated in kind (Naturalrestitution/réparation en
nature/risarcimento in natura) or through a monetary award (art 43 CO). The
Code of Obligations300 does not give preference to one or the other type of
compensation. In practice, however, monetary relief is the rule.
108 Compensation is calculated on the basis of the loss actually suffered by the
individual claimant (‘subjective-concrete’ method, as opposed to the ‘ob-
jective-abstract’ method),301 although certain exceptions have been recog-
nised by the Federal Court. Thus, no actual loss is required in case of so-
called ‘household damage’302 or where an injured person is taken care of at
home by friends or relatives.303
295 See, eg, Schwenzer (fn 234) para 15.07. On the test of remoteness in tort claims, see
supra, no 47.
296 See, eg, Brehm (fn 97) art 41 no 70.
297 See Widmer (fn 178) 300.
298 Art 41(1) CO (fn 98).
299 Art 42(2) CO (fn 98). For details, see Brehm (fn 97) art 42 no 1 ff.
300 Supra fn 98.
301 See, eg, BGE 129 III 135, 141 (Federal Court decision of 19 December 2002); Schnyder
(fn 96) art 42 no 2–3;Werro (fn 174) paras 928 ff.
302 See infra, no 117.
303 See infra, no 111.
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109Compensation should not lead to an enrichment of the injured person.304
Accordingly, if the injured person receives anymonetary benefits owing to
the tortious conduct, such benefits will be taken into account when
determining the loss (Vorteilsanrechnung/imputation des avantages/imputa-
zione dei vantaggi). This also applies if a third party is statutorily or
contractually obligated to make a contribution because of the injury (eg
statutory sick pay by the injured person’s employer), although such party
may be entitled to take recourse against the tortfeasor.305 Benefits are not
deducted if such deduction is excluded by statutory provisions (eg in the
case of fixed-benefit insurance)306 or by the intention of the parties (eg in
the case of voluntary contributions by the injured person’s employer).307
110If tortious conduct leads to bodily injury, the injured party is entitled to
compensation for all costs incurred as a result of the injury (damnum
emergens), eg first aid costs, transportation costs, hospital fees, expenditure
for medical drugs and devices, as well as to compensation for loss of
earnings (lucrum cessans) (art 46 CO).308 If the injured person will receive
less social retirement benefits as a result of his reduced income, the
tortfeasor will also be liable for such ‘retirement damage’ (Rentenschaden/
dommage de rente/danno di rendita).309
111Compensation is also owed for costs and losses suffered by relatives when
visiting the injured person in hospital (ie costs of the trip and loss of
earnings). If the injured person is cared for at home by friends or relatives
at no charge, compensation is available on the basis of the average cost of
home care, even if no actual loss has been suffered.310 In such cases,
compensation is due to the injured party himself. The (rather far–fetched)
dogmatic construction is that such relatives would be entitled to claim
remuneration from the injured party for their visiting costs or the provi-
sion of care, so that their claims against the injured party (even if they
never actually arise) constitute additional items of damage.311
304 See, eg, Werro (fn 174) paras 942 ff; Brehm (fn 97) art 42 no 27 ff; Schnyder (fn 96) art 42
no 7.
305 On the right of recourse of social insurers, see supra, nos 27 ff.
306 See art 96 AIC (fn 92).
307 See, eg, Brehm (fn 97) art 46 no 38 f; Rey (fn 137) para 215.
308 For details, see Brehm (fn 97) art 46 no 7 ff.
309 See, in particular, BGE 129 III 135, 141 (Federal Court decision of 19 December 2002).
310 See unpublished Federal Court decision 4C.276/2001 of 26 March 2002, at paras 6.b.aa
and 6.b.bb; BGE 97 II 259, 266 (Federal Court decision of 12 October 1971). For details,
see Brehm (fn 160) 325, 340 (at paras 72 f).
311 See Brehm (fn 97) art 46 no 14, 17; V Roberto, Schadensrecht (1997) 153 f.
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112 If tortious conduct leads to a person’s death, the deceased’s heirs are
entitled to compensation for funeral expenses. If death was not immedi-
ate, the tortfeasor will also be liable for medical expenses and loss of
earnings. Persons to whom the deceased provided support are entitled to
compensation for loss of that support (Versorgerschaden/perte de soutien/
perdita del sostegno) (art 45 CO).312
113 These general rules also apply in case of medical malpractice.
22. Loss of earnings vs loss of earning capacity
114 Compensation for temporary or permanent loss of earning capacity (Ar-
beitsunfähigkeit/incapacité de travail/impedimento al lavoro) is calculated on the
basis of the injured person’s actual or expected loss of income. A merely
abstract loss of earning power is not indemnified.313
115 In the case of a permanent loss of earning capacity, the court may not
simply consider the injured person’s current income. Rather, it must
make a projection as to how the injured person’s career path and income
would have developed if such person had not suffered any injury. This is
especially difficult where the injured person is a young adult who has not
yet embarked on a career, and even more so where children are con-
cerned.314
116 The Federal Court recently changed its case law by holding that compen-
sation for loss of earnings must be calculated on the basis of the injured
person’s net (and not gross) income.315 The injured person’s ‘retirement
damage’316 is indemnified on the basis of such person’s actual loss. Such
loss is calculated by deducting the social insurance benefits that will
actually be paid out to the injured person upon reaching old age from
the hypothetical old-age benefits that such person would have received if
he had not been injured.317
117 Where a homemaker has been injured, the Federal Court recognises an
exception to the rule that only an actual or expected loss of incomemay be
compensated. If the homemaker is unable to take care of the household
312 See, eg, Brehm (fn 160) 325, 346 ff (at paras 95 ff).
313 See Brehm (fn 160) 325, 342 (at para 80); id (fn 97) art 46 no 35;Honsell (fn 174) § 8 no 67.
314 For details, see Brehm (fn 160) 325, 342–343 (at paras 81–84); see also Roberto (fn 143)
paras 660 ff.
315 BGE 129 III 135, 141 ff (Federal Court decision of 19 December 2002).
316 See supra, no 110.
317 BGE 129 III 135, 150–151 (Federal Court decision of 19 December 2002).
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because of an injury, he will be entitled to compensation calculated on the
basis of the average cost of home help, regardless of whether home help is
actually employed or not (so-called ‘household damage’; Haushaltschaden/
dommage ménager/danno della casalinga).318 Similarly, where the injured
person worked gratuitously, eg in an effort to assist a spouse to establish
or maintain a business venture, such person will also be entitled to
compensation.319
23. Periodic payments or lump sum?
118Pecuniary losses caused by bodily injury can be indemnified on a periodic
basis or by lump sum. In general, it is in the court’s discretion to decide
whether indemnification shall be paid on a periodic basis or by capitalised
(lump) sum.320
119Until fairly recently, the constant practice of the Federal Court was that in
the case of permanent damage, lump sum payment should be the rule
rather than the exception. In 1999, however, it changed its position and
decided that in principle, the injured person may choose between a lump
sum or periodic payment.321
120Costs incurred as a result of the tortious conduct are generally indemni-
fied by a lump sum.322
24. Caps and thresholds
121As a rule, there are no caps on the amounts available as compensation in
Swiss law. An exception applies with respect to aviation liability under the
Warsaw Convention.323 Likewise, there is no general minimum damage
requirement.
318 See, eg, BGE 129 III 135, 151 ff (Federal Court decision of 19 December 2002); BGE 127
III 403, 405 ff (Federal Court decision of 21 June 2001); BGE 132 III 321, 332 (Federal
Court decision of 17 January 2006); Schwenzer (fn 234) para 14.10; Brehm (fn 160) 325,
341 (at para 79); Roberto (fn 143) para 732.
319 BGE 99 II 221, 224 (Federal Court decision of 26 June 1973).
320 Art 43(2) CO (fn 98). See BGE 125 III 312, 320 (Federal Court decision of 11 May 1999);
Brehm (fn 97) art 43 no 7.
321 BGE 125 III 312, 320–321 (Federal Court decision of 11 May 1999). For details on
capitalisation, see Brehm (fn 160) 325, 344 f (at paras 90 f).
322 See, eg, Schnyder (fn 96) art 46 no 12.
323 See Brehm (fn 160) 325, 350 (at para 117).
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122 Both a cap and a minimum damage requirement are included in the
Federal Act on Crime Victims Support.324 However, this Act does not
establish or limit civil liability; rather, it aims to fill the gap where a crime
victim and/or his relatives cannot otherwise receive compensation (eg
because the offender is unknown or insolvent)325 by providing an entitle-
ment against the Canton where the crime was perpetrated. Under the Act,
compensation for pecuniary loss is capped at CHF 120,000, and the
minimum required damage is CHF 500.326 Moreover, such compensation
is only available to persons with modest income.327 Compensation for the
victim’s non-pecuniary loss is capped at CHF 70,000, whereas the max-
imum compensation available to his relatives for their non-pecuniary loss
is CHF 35,000.328
123 Under the Swiss Product Liability Act,329 the claimant must bear his own
pecuniary loss up to an amount of CHF 900. This sum will be deducted
from his damages claim. At the same time, this provision works as a
minimum damage requirement. However, it does not apply to losses
sustained as a result of bodily injury.330
II. Non-pecuniary loss
25. Introduction to indemnifying non-pecuniary loss
124 The main provisions on non-pecuniary loss are set forth in the Swiss Code
of Obligations (CO).331 Compensation for non-pecuniary loss may also be
available in the case of public liability; however, that is a matter of
cantonal law.332 The following paragraphs are confined to non-pecuniary
loss under federal private law.
125 If a person has suffered bodily injury, the court may award him an
appropriate sum for emotional distress (Genugtuung/réparation morale/ripa-
324 Federal Act on Crime Victims Support (CVSA) (Bundesgesetz über die Hilfe an Opfer von
Straftaten [Opferhilfegesetz, OHG]) of 23 March 2007, SR 312.5.
325 Art 4(1) CVSA (fn 324).
326 Art 20(3) CVSA (fn 324).
327 Art 6(1) CVSA (fn 324).
328 Art 23(2) CVSA (fn 324).
329 See supra, no 72.
330 Art 6(1) PLA (fn 199).
331 Supra, fn 98.
332 On cantonal public law, see supra, nos 95 ff.
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razione), ‘giving due consideration to the circumstances of the case’ (art 47
CO).333 Compensation will usually be awarded if the claimant has suffered
permanent damage which will cause physical discomfort or emotional
distress for the rest of his life, although lesser injuries (such as an injury
necessitating a long stay in hospital) may also qualify.334 Compensation is
also available even if the victim is no longer able to appreciate his situation
due to the injury, such as in the case of severe brain damage.335
126If a person is killed, the court can award the victim’s relatives an appro-
priate sum for emotional distress, again giving due consideration to the
circumstances of the case (art 47 CO).336
127Compensation for non-pecuniary loss is also available if a person’s person-
ality rights are otherwise wrongfully infringed, on condition that such
infringement is sufficiently serious to merit compensation and cannot
otherwise be made good (art 49 CO). In particular, a victim’s relatives may
be entitled to compensation for the emotional distress caused them by the
victim’s injury.337
128Both under art 47 and art 49 CO, compensation for non-pecuniary loss is
only available if the claimant has a cause of action in tort or in contract.338
However, contractual claims are generally only available to the direct
victim. As a rule, indirectly affected persons can only sue in tort.339
129If more than one person owes the injured party compensation for non-
pecuniary loss, the Federal Court has held that such persons will be jointly
and severally liable.340
130Compensation for non-pecuniary loss is determined on a case-to-case
basis; there are no fixed standard rates. Rather, the court may determine
the amount of compensation at its discretion. However, courts tend to
follow the amounts awarded by other courts in previous decisions with
333 On the relevant criteria, see infra, no 130.
334 See, eg, Brehm (fn 160) 325, 349 (at para 110).
335 BGE 108 II 422, 431 ff (Federal Court decision of 6 July 1982); for further references
and a critique of the Federal Court’s decisions, see Brehm (fn 97) art 47 no 21 ff.
336 See infra, no 135.
337 See infra, no 136.
338 See Schwenzer (fn 234) para 17.06; cf also BGE 123 III 204, 206–207 (Federal Court
decision of 9 June 1997).
339 See infra, no 137.
340 See, eg, BGE 116 II 645, 650–651 (Federal Court decision of 9 October 1990). For a
detailed discussion of this issue and further references to case law, see Brehm (fn 97)
art 47 no 97 ff.
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similar facts.341 Criteria for assessing compensation are, in particular, the
nature of the injury, the gravity, intensity and duration of its effects on the
victim, the degree of the liable person’s fault, whether the victim is
partially at fault, and the chances that the award will alleviate the victim’s
emotional distress.342
131 The Federal Court recently held that non-pecuniary losses can also be
indemnified on a periodic basis, although payment by lump sum is the
rule.343
132 Swiss Courts are traditionally reluctant to award large sums for pain and
suffering, although awards are getting larger. In recent years, the follow-
ing sums have been awarded:
n in the case of severe disability: up to CHF 200,000;344
n in the case of death of a close relative: CHF 10,000–50,000 (depending
on the closeness of the bond between victim and relative);345
n in the case of severe disability of a close relative: CHF 20,000–50,000; the
Federal Court has indicated that close relatives should receive approxi-
mately half of the amount awarded to the injured person himself.346
133 These general rules on non-pecuniary loss also apply in case of medical
malpractice.
26. Who can claim compensation for non-pecuniary loss?
134 In the case of bodily injury, the direct victim may claim compensation for
non-pecuniary loss under art 47 CO.347
135 If the direct victim dies, the court may award the victim’s ‘relatives’
compensation for emotional distress (art 47 CO). The term ‘relatives’ is
341 Courts often consult the table of court decisions provided by K Hütte/P Ducksch/K
Guerrero, Die Genugtuung: eine tabellarische Übersicht über Gerichtsentscheide aus
den Jahren 1990–2005 (3rd edn 2006).
342 BGE 132 II 117, 119 (Federal Court decision of 19 January 2006).
343 BGE 134 III 97, 99 f (Federal Court decision of 8 January 2008).
344 See M Sidler, Die Genugtuung und ihre Bemessung, in: Münch/Geiser (fn 97) 445,
468 ff (at paras 10.54–55); Schwenzer (fn 234) para 17.14; Rey (fn 137) para 504; Brehm (fn
160) 325, 354 (at para 132).
345 See Sidler (fn 344) 445, 476 ff (at para 10.66); Schwenzer (fn 234) para 17.14; Rey (fn 137)
para 505.
346 See Sidler (fn 344) 445, 480 (at para 10.69); Schwenzer (fn 234) para 17.14 with further
references.
347 On the requirements under art 47 CO, see supra, nos 125 and 130.
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misleading, as it is neither sufficient nor necessary for the claimant to be a
member of the victim’s family. Rather, the closeness of the bond between
victim and claimant is decisive. Spouses, registered partners, parents and
children of the victim will usually be entitled to compensation; fiancé(e)s
and non-married partners may also qualify, as may brothers and sisters,
grandparents and grandchildren etc as long as their bond with the
deceased was sufficiently close.348 It is not necessary for these persons to
have lived in the same household as the deceased.
136If the victim is severely disabled, the victim’s close relatives, such as
parents, spouses and children,349 may also claim compensation in their
own right on the basis of art 49 CO. However, such compensation is only
granted if the victim’s injury affects them at least as much as the victim’s
death would have.350 Although art 49 CO could also serve as a basis for
compensating other persons whose personality rights are infringed as a
result of the victim’s injuries, such claims have not yet been brought
before the Federal Court.
137As a rule, claims brought by a disabled victim’s relatives under art 49 CO
or by a deceased victim’s relatives under art 47 CO can only be based in
tort, not in contract.351 The practical consequence is that such claims will
be subject to the shorter statute of limitations for tort suits.352 The only
exception is where the victim’s relative himself contracted with the liable
party, for example where the victim’s legal guardian entered into a
contract for the provision of medical services.353
G. Procedural Matters
27. Specific rules of jurisdiction or procedure
138As pointed out above, procedural laws relating to public liability in
Switzerland are not federal, but cantonal, and until recently, the same
348 See Schwenzer (fn 234) para 17.09; Brehm (fn 97) art 47 no 133 ff.
349 See BGE 116 II 519, 520–521 (Federal Court decision of 23 October 1990). For further
references to case law, see Brehm (fn 97) art 49 no 67 f.
350 BGE 123 III 204, 206 (Federal Court decision of 9 June 1997).
351 See supra, no 86.
352 Cf supra, no 83. For an example from case law, see BGE 123 III 204, 206 ff (Federal
Court decision of 9 June 1997).
353 Cf supra, no 87. For an example from case law, see BGE 116 II 519, 520–521 (Federal
Court decision of 23 October 1990). See also Case 1, infra, nos 151 ff.
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was also true with respect to civil procedure.354 It is beyond the scope of
this report to give details on the procedural laws of each of the 26 Cantons.
Generally, however, medical malpractice cases will not be treated differ-
ently to other cases under cantonal procedural laws, and the same applies
under the Federal Act on Civil Procedure.
139 If claims are brought under federal private law, jurisdiction will lie with
the ordinary civil courts of the Cantons.355 The place of jurisdiction is
determined by federal law,356 which does not set forth any special rules
regarding medical malpractice.
140 If public liability is at issue, claims will often also fall within the jurisdiction
of the ordinary civil law courts; however, this is a matter of cantonal law.357
28. Special institutions handling malpractice claims
141 If a patient suffers injury in the course of medical treatment and suspects
that he is a victim of medical malpractice, he (or his successor) may contact
the Swiss Medical Association (FMH) before going to court. The FMH
operates a special ‘Out-of-Court Expert Report Office’ (aussergerichtliche
Gutachterstelle/Bureau d’expertises extra-judiciaires).
142 The proceedings before the Office are governed by a regulation passed by the
FMH.358 All FMH-members must submit to, and cooperate in, proceedings
before the Office.359 If a member refuses to cooperate, he will be subject to
the disciplinary sanctions under the FMH’s rules of professional conduct.360
143 As the FMH is a private organisation, its regulations are only binding on its
members. As soon as other persons (eg non-members, hospitals, or a
Canton) might be liable, be it exclusively or together with a member of the
FMH, the Office will not act unless such persons agree to submit to the
proceedings.361
354 See supra, nos 8 and 103.
355 See Guillod (fn 87) 392, 413 (at para 83).
356 See the Federal Act on Civil Procedure (fn 18), which includes jurisdictional rules in its
arts 9 ff.
357 See supra, no 103.
358 Regulation on the FMH-Office for Out-of-Court Expert Reports on Medical Liability
(Reglement für die FMH-Gutachterstelle zur aussergerichtlichen Begutachtung von Ärztehaft-
pflichtfällen) of 1 February 2002, available at <http://www.fmh.ch/files/pdf1/Regle-
ment_D.pdf> (12.01.11).
359 Art 2 of the Regulation (fn 358).
360 On these rules, see supra, no 38.
361 Art 3 of the Regulation (fn 358).
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144The Office will only commission an expert report on the patient’s case if
certain requirements are met.362 In particular, the alleged mistake must
have caused considerable injury to the applicant. The Office will not accept
a patient’s application for an expert report if a court case is pending.
145The subject-matter of the expert reports commissioned by the Office is
limited. The designated expert(s) must first assess whether the doctor
breached any duty of care with respect to diagnosis or treatment. If this is
answered in the affirmative, the expert(s) must also assess the conse-
quences of the breach for the patient’s health (issue of causation).363 The
parties are not legally bound to accept the expert’s conclusions,364
although the doctor concerned (and the liability insurer, who is also
involved in the proceedings) usually does so.365
146In all cases, the applicant must pay administrative charges of CHF 600
(plus VAT). In certain circumstances, the Office may request an additional
CHF 2,000 as security from the applicant, in particular if there is only a
small likelihood of a mistake in diagnosis or treatment.366
147From 1982 to 2009, 3233 expert reports were made under the Office’s
supervision.367 Amistake in treatment or diagnosis was confirmed in 1065
cases (32.9 %), denied in 2075 cases (64.2 %), and left undecided in the
remaining 93 cases (2.9 %). The majority of alleged mistakes occurred in
surgery (804 reports made, 278 mistakes confirmed), orthopaedic surgery
(596 reports made, 211 mistakes confirmed), and gynaecology/obstetrics
(395 reports made, 151 mistakes confirmed).368
H. Outlook
29. Reform plans
148There are currently no comprehensive reform plans relating to medical
liability in Switzerland. Although the preliminary draft law on tort reform
362 See art 5 of the Regulation (fn 358).
363 Art 13(1) of the Regulation (fn 358).
364 Art 14(2) of the Regulation (fn 358).
365 See Guillod (fn 87) 392, 414 (at para 87 in fine).
366 Art 9 of the Regulation (fn 358).
367 The Office’s annual reports are available at <http://www.fmh.ch/service/gutachter-
stelle/jahresberichte.html> (12.01.11).
368 L Rabia/N Favre, Annual Report of the FMH-Office 2009 (Aussergerichtliche FMH-Gutach-
terstelle – Jahresbericht 2009), SÄZ No 30–31/2010, 1131 ff.
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included several provisions which would have had an impact on various
aspects of medical liability,369 this project has now been abandoned by the
Federal Council.370 The only remaining item on the tort reform agenda is
the extension of the general limitation period for tort claims.371
149 Nonetheless, issues relating to selected areas of medical activity are being
discussed. Thus, the draft Federal Act onHuman Research372 provides that
persons or institutions that have initiated human research projects shall
be strictly liable for any damage suffered by human research subjects,
although the Federal Council may provide for exceptions.373 Strict liability
under the draft covers compensation for bodily injury, property damage,
and harm caused to the subject’s personality rights. Both pecuniary and
non-pecuniary losses are covered.374 Claims are subject to a limitation
period of three years from the day the harmed person acquired knowledge
of the damage and the liable party’s identity. In any event, the maximum
limitation period is ten years from the day the research project was
completed. The Federal Council may provide longer limitation periods
for particular research areas.375 The potentially liable party must take out
liability insurance or provide other, equivalent security.376
150 Another item on the political agenda relating to health issues is the draft
Federal Act on Prevention and Health Promotion.377 However, this draft
does not include any provisions on medical liability.
369 See P Wessner, La révision totale du droit de la responsabilité civile: quelques orienta-
tions nouvelles susceptibles d’influencer le domaine des soins médicaux et hospita-
liers, Le responsabilité médicale (1996) 57 ff.
370 See the Federal Council’s press release of 21 January 2009, supra fn 148.
371 See supra, no 53.
372 Entwurf eines Bundesgesetzes über die Forschung am Menschen (Humanforschungsgesetz, HFG) of
21 October 2009, available at <http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2009/8163.pdf> (12.01.11).
373 Art 19(1) of the draft (fn 372).
374 Message of the Federal Council concerning the Federal Act on Human Research (Botschaft
zum Bundesgesetz über die Forschung am Menschen) of 21 October 2009, Bundesblatt 2009,
8045, 8109, available at <http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2009/8045.pdf> (12.01.11).
375 Art 19(2) of the draft (fn 372).
376 Art 20 of the draft (fn 372).
377 Entwurf eines Bundesgesetzes über Prävention und Gesundheitsförderung (Präventionsgesetz,
PrävG) of 30 September 2009, available at <http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2009/
7189.pdf> (12.01.11). The Message of the Federal Council is available at <http://
www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2009/7071.pdf> (12.01.11).
Corinne Widmer Lüchinger
594
Brought to you by | Universitaetsbibliothek Basel
Authenticated
Download Date | 10/23/18 2:22 PM
Cases
Case 1
151The following analysis is based on the assumption that the hospital run by
C is a private hospital, subject to federal private law.378 From the facts of the
case, one can assume that both A and D made a mistake during treatment.
152As the newborn Y does not have a contract with either A, B, or C, she will
not be able to sue any of them in contract – at least not under traditional
rules.379 Y might sue in tort instead, but will in any case face several
difficulties.
153A might be liable for Y’s pecuniary loss under art 41(1) CO380 and for Y’s
non-pecuniary loss under art 47 CO.381 However, Y’s claims will only
succeed if she can prove that A’s conduct was a conditio sine qua non of her
condition. The burden of proof with regard to causation lies with Y, even
if A’s conduct qualifies as a grave mistake. Y will have to show that A’s
mistake more likely than not caused, in whole or in part, the damage
suffered. A will not be liable if it is merely possible that his conduct caused
Y’s injury in whole or in part.382
154The issue of causation will also arise if Y sues B or C in tort. Moreover, as B
himself did not make any mistake, he might only be liable for Y’s
pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss if either A or D’s conduct could be
imputed to him under art 55(1) CO.383 However, neither A (with whom B
shares a joint practice) nor D (who is employed by C) is subject to B’s
supervision and authority to issue directives.384 Accordingly, B cannot be
held responsible toward Y for either A or D’s conduct.
155Likewise, A’s conduct cannot be imputed to C under art 55(1) CO, as A is
an affiliated doctor and therefore not subordinate to C.385 In contrast, as
midwife D is employed by C, her conduct will generally be imputed to C
378 Cf supra, no 45.
379 The concept of contracts with protective effect for third parties has not hitherto been
recognised in Swiss law (see supra, no 88). However, a lawyer representing Y might
argue that the contracts entered into by Y’s mother were also concluded for the benefit
of her unborn child, so that Y, once she was born, could base her claim in contract (see
supra, no 87). This line of argument has not yet been brought before the Federal Court.
380 On the requirements under art 41(1) CO, cf supra, no 47.
381 On liability for non-pecuniary loss, cf supra, nos 124 ff.
382 Cf supra, no 56.
383 On the requirements under art 55(1) CO, see supra, nos 48 ff.
384 On the requirement of subordination, see supra, no 48.
385 Cf supra, no 68.
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(and not to A), unless her mistake occurred whilst she was de facto subject
to A’s supervision and authority to issue directives.386 Accordingly, C
might be liable for Y’s pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss if the further
requirements of art 55(1) CO are met. C could avoid liability by proving
that he took all precautions necessary to prevent damage of the kind
suffered.387 However, the central issue in a claim against C will be that of
causation: Y will have to prove that her injury was caused, in whole or in
part, by D’s tortious conduct.388
156 If Y succeeds in proving causation both with respect to A and D, and if C is
unable to prove that all necessary precautionary measures were taken, A
and C will be jointly and severally liable toward Y for any pecuniary loss
suffered by Y which is not too remote (art 51 CO).389 Such compensation
would also, in principle, cover the costs of day care by professional nursing
staff, even if the associated costs are greater than if Y lived in a nursing
home. Although the injured party must take all reasonable steps to
mitigate the loss, he is not required to take the least expensive option.
Rather, if a certain measure is necessary or at least beneficial to the injured
party and also appropriate from a medical standpoint, the ensuing costs
should be compensated.390 However, this issue has not hitherto been
raised before the Federal Court.
157 If Y succeeds in proving causation, she will also be entitled to claim
compensation for the care provided by X, on the basis of the average cost
of home care.391 Due to the gravity of the injury,392 Y would also receive
compensation for non-pecuniary loss under art 47 CO. If a cause of action
is maintainable against both A and C, they will again be jointly and
severally liable.393
158 Unlike Y, X entered into a contract with B and, once she was admitted to
C’s hospital, also into a contract with C. X’s contract with C will be
classified as a ‘fractioned hospital contract’.394 Accordingly, both B and C
may be liable toward X in contract under art 97(1) CO.395
386 Cf supra, nos 68 and 48.
387 Cf supra, no 50.
388 Cf already supra, no 153. On the standard of proof, see supra, no 56.
389 On joint and several liability, see supra, no 66.
390 Cf Roberto (fn 311) 152 f.
391 See supra, no 111.
392 Cf supra, no 130.
393 Cf supra, no 129.
394 See supra, no 79.
395 On the requirements under art 97(1) CO, see supra, no 82.
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159As B’s locum, A will be considered B’s auxiliary under art 101(1) CO,396 so
that A’s acts or omissions will be imputed to B for the purposes of liability.
Midwife D will be considered either C’s or B’s auxiliary, depending on
whether the taking of a CTG fell within C’s or B’s contractual responsi-
bilities.397 In any case, however, the central problem for X will also be the
issue of causation, which she must prove. With respect to B’s liability, X
must show that A’s mistake more likely than not caused, in whole or in
part, her pecuniary loss. Likewise, if D is qualified as C’s auxiliary, C will
only be liable for X’s pecuniary loss if D’s mistake more likely than not
caused such loss, in whole or in part.398
160If X succeeded in proving causation both with respect to A and D’s
conduct, B and C would be jointly and severally liable toward X for her
pecuniary loss (art 51 CO).399 It is probable that Swiss Courts would award
X compensation for the care that she herself is providing to Y on the basis
of the average cost of home care. It would not be necessary for X to suffer
actual pecuniary loss (eg by giving up her job). However, the Federal Court
has hitherto only had occasion to discuss such claims brought by the
injured party himself.400
161Due to the gravity of the injury, X would also be entitled to compensation
for non-pecuniary loss under art 49 CO.401 If a cause of action were
maintainable against both B and C, they would be jointly and severally
liable for such loss.402 This would also apply with respect to the stillbirth
of X’s son, if X were able to prove that such stillbirth was caused by A and
D’s mistakes.
162As X did not enter into a contract with A, any claims against A would be in
tort (art 41[1] CO). Here, as before, the main issue will be that of causation.
Additionally, the question will arise as to whether A’s conduct toward X
can be classified as wrongful under art 41(1) CO. X seeks an award of
compensation for the care that she herself is providing to Y. Such damage
constitutes pure economic loss, for which compensation is only available if
a ‘protective norm’ (Schutznorm/norme de protection/norma protettiva) has been
breached. The same problem would also arise if X were to sue B and/or C
396 On art 101(1) CO, see supra, no 85.
397 Cf supra, no 79.
398 On the burden of proof with regard to causation, see supra, no 56.
399 On joint and several liability, see supra, no 66.
400 Cf supra, nos 111 and 157.
401 Cf supra, no 136.
402 See supra, no 129.
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in tort rather than in contract, although given the advantages of contract
claims,403 she would be unlikely to do so.
Case 2
163 The Federal Court decided the controversial issue of ‘wrongful concep-
tion’ in favour of the child’s parents in 2005.404 In that case, the claimant
was to undergo a Caesarean section with her second child and had
requested that she be sterilised at the same time. The claimant and her
husband had decided on sterilisation for economic reasons. However, the
hospital negligently omitted to perform the sterilisation. Unaware of the
mistake, the claimant soon after became pregnant and subsequently gave
birth to her third child. The claimant’s husband assigned his contractual
rights to the claimant, who then successfully sued the hospital. She was
granted compensation for pecuniary loss, including child maintenance
costs, by the cantonal courts, as well as compensation for non-pecuniary
loss. The cantonal decision was confirmed by the Federal Court.
164 As a result of the Federal Court’s decision, it is safe to assume that in
principle, A will be liable in contract toward X for any pecuniary loss
sustained as a result of the birth of her son Z, including child maintenance
costs throughout the child’s minority and loss of earnings, on condition
that A breached his contractual obligations toward X (art 97[1] CO).405
However, one important difference between the Federal Court decision
and Case 2 is that in Case 2, it is not clear whether X had decided against
having children once and for all, or only for the time-being. This issue of
‘timing’ was not raised before the Federal Court, and even if it had been, it
would probably not have made any difference as the claimant and her
husband already had two children. The situation is different with respect
to X; although her choice of contraception indicates that she had no wish
to become pregnant in the near future, it is not clear whether she had
decided against having children once and for all. It has been suggested
that where a woman has only decided against having children at a certain
moment in time, only the pecuniary loss resulting from the premature
birth of a child may be compensated.406 However, one might object that it
will usually be impossible to prove whether the woman in question has
403 See supra, nos 83 ff.
404 BGE 132 III 359 ff (Federal Court decision of 20 December 2005).
405 On the requirements under art 97(1) CO, see supra, no 82.
406 See Roberto (fn 143) para 768.
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reached a final decision or not, nor can anyone (including the woman
herself) know whether she might have changed her mind in the future. It
remains to be seen how the Federal Court would decide this issue.
165It might also be possible for X to bring a claim in tort under art 41(1)
CO,407 although this issue has not yet been raised before the Federal Court
(and is unlikely to be, unless the claimant is unable to sue in contract).408
In a tort claim against A, the central issue would be whether A’s conduct
qualifies as wrongful for the purposes of art 41(1) CO. This would
probably be answered in the affirmative, as X’s personality rights (namely
her autonomy of decision) have been infringed.409
166Thematter is more complex with respect to Z’s father, Y. As the concept of
contracts with protective effect for third parties has not hitherto been
recognised in Swiss law,410 Y would only be able to sue in contract if he was
also a party to the contract between A and X. However, it might be
possible for Y to bring a claim against A in tort under art 41(1) CO. The
central issue in such a claim would be whether A’s conduct can be
considered wrongful with regard to Y. This issue has not yet been raised
before the Federal Court, but might be answered in the affirmative based
on Y’s personality rights.411
Case 3
167The following analysis is based on the assumption that both the hospital
run by A and the clinic run by C are private hospitals, subject to federal
private law.412
168As X himself did not enter into a contract with A, any claims by X against A
would be be based in tort, at least under traditional rules.413 It is probable
that such a claim would succeed, both with respect to X’s pecuniary loss
under art 55(1) CO414 and his non-pecuniary loss under art 47 CO.415 The
obstetrician’s failure to seek the advice of a paediatrician and the failure to
407 On the requirements under art 41(1) CO, cf supra, no 47.
408 See also Roberto (fn 143) para 486. On the advantages of contract claims over tort claims,
see supra, nos 83 ff.
409 Cf Roberto (fn 143) para 486.
410 See supra, no 88.
411 Cf supra, no 165, with regard to X.
412 Cf supra, no 45.
413 Cf supra, no 152 with fn 379.
414 On the requirements under art 55(1) CO, see supra, nos 48 ff.
415 On liability for non-pecuniary loss, cf supra, nos 124 ff.
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inform X’s mother and the midwife of the necessity to monitor X’s blood
sugar levels would be imputed to A under art 55(1) CO. Although it is
recognised in Swiss law that the link between original cause and effect
may be interrupted by subsequent events (Unterbrechnung des Kausalzusam-
menhangs/interruption de la causalité/interruzione della causalità)416 with the
result that the original cause will be considered too remote, it is unlikely
that this would help A to avoid liability. Such an ‘interruption’ is admitted
only rarely by Swiss courts, as it means taking an ‘all or nothing’ approach
to liability.417 Moreover, had X been treated properly in A’s hospital,
midwife B and the clinic C would not actually have had the ‘opportunity’
to contribute to X’s injuries. It is also unlikely that A would succeed in
showing that it exercised all due diligence in selecting, instructing and
overseeing the obstetrician.
169 With respect to midwife B, it is probable that she would be held liable
toward X not only in tort under art 41(1) CO,418 but also in contract under
art 97(1) CO,419 as X’s mother entered into the contract with B for X’s
benefit.420 However, midwife B will in any case only be liable toward X if
her conduct was a conditio sine qua non of X’s injuries, which X will have to
prove. It is sufficient, but also necessary, that X’s injuries would probably
have been avoided if B had sought the advice of a paediatrician.421 If such
proof is provided, B will also be liable for X’s non-pecuniary loss, on the
basis of art 47 CO in conjunction with art 41(1) and art 97(1) CO,
respectively.
170 C will likely also be held liable toward X in contract under art 97(1) CO, as
X’s parents entered into a contract with C for X’s benefit.422 The failure to
provide X with adequate care on time due to organisational deficiencies
qualifies as a breach of C’s contractual duties toward X, and as C will be
considered responsible for ensuring that the clinic is organised satisfacto-
rily, C will not succeed in showing that it bore no fault. Also, E’s conduct
will be imputed to C on the basis of art 101(1) CO.423 As it can be assumed
with a very high degree of probability that X’s injuries were sustained in
C’s clinic, the requirement of causation is also fulfilled. Accordingly, C
416 See, eg, Rey (fn 137) paras 551 ff.
417 See, eg,Werro (fn 174) para 223.
418 On the requirements under art 41(1) CO, cf supra, no 47.
419 On the requirements under art 97(1) CO, see supra, no 82.
420 Cf supra, no 87.
421 Cf supra, no 56.
422 Cf supra, no 87.
423 On art 101(1) CO, see supra, no 85.
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will be liable for X’s pecuniary loss, as well as for X’s non-pecuniary loss
under art 97(1) in conjunction with art 47 CO.
171C could also be held liable for X’s pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss on the
basis of art 55(1) CO. Although a contractual claim will be more advanta-
geous,424 X is free to choose whether to sue C in contract or in tort. As E is
subordinated to C, her conduct would be imputed to C under art 55(1) CO.
C would not succeed in showing that it had exercised all due diligence in
selecting, instructing and overseeing her, as E had not been instructed to
take and record a detailed case history, nor to call an experienced doctor
within a reasonable period of time.
172On condition that E’s conduct constituted a conditio sine qua non of X’s
damage (which X has to prove), E will be liable toward X in tort under
art 41(1) CO. Her lack of experience will not serve to exonerate her, as she
should at least have recognised that she lacked the experience to correctly
assess X’s state and called on an experienced doctor when she saw the
alarming results of the first test. She will also be held liable for X’s non-
pecuniary loss under art 41(1) in conjunction with art 47 CO.
173Liability of A, B, C, and E will be joint and several (art 51 CO).425
Compensation for X’s pecuniary loss will cover the costs of nursing care
and the expenses caused by X’s increased needs (art 46 CO).426 With respect
to X’s loss of earning capacity, the court will make a projection as to how
X’s career path and income would have developed without the sustained
injuries. Swiss courts tend to base such projections on the careers chosen
by the victim’s family members. In case of very young victims, courts tend
to be conservative when assessing loss of future earnings.427 X may choose
between compensation by lump sum and periodic payment.428 Damages
will be calculated on the basis of X’s estimated future net income. In
addition, X will be entitled to compensation for his ‘retirement dam-
age’.429 Given the grave nature of X’s injuries, A, B, C, and E will also
liable for X’s non-pecuniary loss (art 47 CO). Such liability will be joint and
several.430
424 On the advantages of contract claims over tort claims, see supra, nos 83 ff.
425 Cf supra, nos 66, 78.
426 For details on calculating such costs, see the case discussion by Brehm (fn 160) 325, 359
(at paras 158 ff).
427 See Brehm (fn 160) 325, 342 f (at paras 83, 84).
428 See supra, no 119.
429 See supra, nos 110 and 116.
430 See supra, no 129.
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Case 4
174 The following analysis is based on the assumption that the A clinic is a
private hospital, subject to federal private law,431 and that X had a contract
only with the A clinic (‘comprehensive hospital contract’).432
175 X was not properly informed of the risks involved with the proposed
operation. Firstly, there was no interpreter present during the consulta-
tion, although X could only speak Persian (and B could not). Accordingly,
B’s information did not put X in a position to reach a well-considered
decision about the suggested procedure.433 Secondly, X was not informed
of the different types of procedure available (transthoracic opening versus
dorsal approach) and the different risks involved. And finally, X was
informed only one day prior to the operation. Given the nature of the
operation and the risks involved, this was too late.434 It is for the A clinic to
prove that X gave his informed consent to the proposed operation.435
176 As the A clinic has not satisfied the legal requirements of informed
consent, it will be liable in contract under art 97(1) CO436 for all damage
suffered by X as a result of the operation, regardless of whether such
damage was caused by a mistake in treatment or simply by chance, as long
as such damage is not too remote.437 B’s failure to properly inform X will
be imputed to the A clinic under art 101(1) CO.438 The A clinic will not
succeed in showing that X would have consented to the intervention even
if he had been properly informed. The test for such ‘hypothetical con-
sent’439 is not whether a ‘reasonable’ patient, but whether the individual
patient would have consented to the intervention. According to the facts
of the case, X would probably not have had surgery at all if he had been
properly informed, and his condition would not necessarily have deterio-
rated without the operation.
177 Accordingly, the A clinic will be liable in contract toward X for the
pecuniary loss caused by the operation, as long as such loss is not too
remote. Compensation will include the costs of converting X’s house to
431 Cf supra, no 45.
432 On comprehensive hospital contracts, see supra, no 78.
433 Cf Fellmann (fn 111) 103, 196.
434 Cf supra, no 92.
435 Cf supra, no 89.
436 On the requirements under art 97(1) CO, see supra, no 82.
437 Cf supra, no 90.
438 Cf supra, no 85.
439 See supra, no 90.
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provide wheelchair access. In contrast, the costs of a new car with wheel-
chair access will only be compensated if X is still able to work and needs an
automobile for that purpose.440 X will also be entitled to compensation for
non-pecuniary loss under art 47 CO, given the grave consequences of the
intervention.441
178X could also claim compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss
from the A clinic in tort (art 55[1] CO), as B, the doctor who (inadequately)
informed X, is subordinated to A.442 It is unlikely that A would succeed in
showing that it exercised all due diligence in selecting, instructing and
overseeing B. As in contract, it would be for the A clinic to prove that X
gave his informed consent to the operation.443 However, contractual
liability is more advantageous for X.444
179As X did not enter into a contract with surgeon C,445 C might only be liable
toward X in tort (art 41[1] CO),446 which is less attractive for X than suing
the A clinic in contract. C will be liable in tort if he was under an
individual duty to inform X prior to the operation. The Federal Court
has not hitherto had to determine with whom precisely the duty to inform
lies in the case of hospitalisation, as injured patients generally sue the
hospital itself (and not the individual doctor). In general, the doctor who is
to perform the procedure is under a duty to inform the patient of the risks
involved. The prevailing opinion in Switzerland is that a doctor may
delegate his duty to inform to another doctor, except where such other
doctor does not have sufficient knowledge of the case or is not sufficiently
qualified. In any case, the delegating doctor must ascertain whether the
patient has been sufficiently informed before he carries out the proce-
dure.447 It follows that in Case 4, surgeon C was at the very least under a
duty to make sure that X had been properly informed by B before the
operation. It is for C to prove that he complied with this duty,448 but as the
facts of the case show that X was not properly informed, C will not
succeed. Accordingly, C will be liable toward X in tort for the same items
of damage as the A clinic and also for non-pecuniary loss under art 47
440 Cf Brehm (fn 97) art 46 no 24, with references to case law.
441 On liability for non-pecuniary loss, cf supra, nos 124 ff.
442 On the requirements under art 55(1) CO, cf supra, nos 48 ff.
443 Cf supra, no 89.
444 Cf supra, nos 83 ff.
445 Cf supra, no 174.
446 On the requirements under art 41(1) CO, cf supra, no 47.
447 See Fellmann (fn 111) 103, 194;Wiegand (fn 272) 119, 149 f.
448 Cf supra, no 89.
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CO.449 Liability of C and the A clinic will be joint and several, both with
regard to compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss.450
180 A and C might object that sooner or later, X would have suffered the same
damage anyway, as X was already suffering frommyelopathy with paraly-
sis symptoms when he was operated on. It is not clear to what extent such
an objection might be heard in Swiss law.451 In any case, the success of
such an objection would depend on the likelihood that damage would
have occurred regardless of the operation at a later point in time.
Case 5
181 As before, the following analysis is based on the assumption that the
hospital run by A is a private hospital, subject to federal private law,452
and that X had a contract only with A (‘comprehensive hospital con-
tract’).453
182 A might be liable toward X in contract under art 97(1) CO.454 In principle,
the acts and omissions of A’s employees B, C, and D during the operation
will be imputed to A under art 101(1) CO.455 However, X will have to prove
that B, C, and/or D made a mistake which constitutes a breach of the
contract between A and X, and that such a breach caused his damage. The
mere fact that X suffered injury is not sufficient to infer medical mal-
practice. Nor is it recognised in Swiss law that the hospital and responsible
doctors bear the burden of proof with regard to the correct positioning of
a patient during an operation.456
183 With respect to A’s liability, two hypotheses are imaginable. Under the
first hypothesis, not even the slightest risk of damage to the nervus ulnaris
is inherent in this type of operation. If this hypothesis is correct, the
damage suffered by X will necessarily imply that his injury was caused by
a mistake made during the operation, so that A will be liable in contract.
449 Cf supra, no 177.
450 Cf supra, nos 78 and 129.
451 See, eg, Schwenzer (fn 234) para 21.05 with further references.
452 Cf supra, no 45.
453 On comprehensive hospital contracts, see supra, no 78.
454 On the requirements under art 97(1) CO, see supra, no 82.
455 Cf supra, no 78.
456 The Federal Court has not yet been called on to decide this issue. See also Kuhn (fn 154)
601, 653 ff.
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184Under the second hypothesis, damage to the nervus ulnaris is an inherent
risk of this type of operation. If this hypothesis is correct, X will be well-
advised to allege that he was not properly informed of this risk, as A will
have to prove that X gave informed consent. If the legal requirements of
informed consent are not satisfied, A will be liable in contract for all
damage suffered by X as a result of the operation, as long as such damage
is not too remote. A may only avoid liability if A can show that X would
have consented to the operation even if he had been properly informed
(hypothetical consent).457
185If A succeeds in proving that X was sufficiently informed of the risks, or
that X would have consented anyway, X will be required to prove that a
mistake was made during the operation. According to the facts of the case,
it cannot be ascertained whether surgeon B positioned X’s arm impro-
perly, as the clinical records are incomplete. Nor can it be ascertained
whether anaesthetist C monitored the proper positioning of X’s arm
during the operation. It is uncertain in Swiss law whether the burden of
proof might be shifted to A because the records are incomplete, although
at the very least, the standard of proof might be relaxed.458 With respect to
the issue of monitoring, C will be required to cooperate in the evidentiary
proceedings before the court. Whether or not a court will be satisfied that
B and/or C made a mistake during the operation cannot be said in the
abstract; rather, this will depend on the court’s appreciation of the
evidence. If the court is satisfied that B and/or C made a mistake, it will
suffice for X to show that such mistake more likely than not caused his
injury.459 Whether or not he is successful will depend on how large the
inherent risk of damage to the nervus ulnaris is.
186By itself, the fact that C was not supervised more closely by D is not
sufficient to hold A liable toward X. If C was not supervised sufficiently
under current professional standards, this will constitute a breach of
contract by A. However, X will still have to prove that such breach more
likely than not caused his damage.460 This will be difficult to prove unless
the court is satisfied that C did not monitor the position of X’s arm
correctly.
457 Cf supra, no 90.
458 Cf supra, no 58.
459 Cf supra, no 56.
460 Cf supra, no 56.
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187 Xmight also choose to sue A in tort on the basis of art 55(1) CO,461 as B, C,
and D are all subordinated to A. However, apart from the fact that tort
claims are less advantageous to the claimant,462 X will still be faced with
the problem of proving that a mistake was made which caused his
damage. As in contract, the situation will change for X’s benefit if he was
not properly informed of the risks inherent in the operation,463 or if no
risk at all of damage to the nervus ulnaris is inherent in this type of
operation.464
188 As far as the liability of B, C, and D is concerned, the same problems of
proof arise as with respect to A, ie as to the questions of mistake and
causation. Again, the situation will change if X did not give his informed
consent or the risk of damage to the nervus ulnaris is not inherent in this
type of operation. In any case, B, C, and Dmight only be liable toward X in
tort (art 41[1] CO).465
189 If liability of A, B, C, or D were accepted, X would receive compensation
for loss of earnings, as he is no longer able to work as a bricklayer. X would
also be entitled to compensation for loss of earnings from his weekend
job. However, if X can reasonably be expected to retrain, for example as a
sales person in a building supplies store, the wages X would earn in such a
position would be deducted from X’s compensation. Whether or not such
retraining can reasonably be expected will depend on X’s age; the older an
injured person is, the less he can be expected to change his occupation.466
Damages for loss of earnings would be calculated on the basis of X’s net
income. X’s ‘retirement damage’ would also be indemnified.467
190 In contrast, it is unlikely that the costs of the private medical injuries
assessment commissioned by X would be compensated, as such assess-
ment would not have been necessary in the instant case. However, this
might depend on whether X had legal representation or not, for although
a lawyer would be expected to know that the facts could be evaluated free
of charge by a specific assessment commission, this might not necessarily
apply to laypersons.
461 On the requirements for liability under art 55(1) CO, see supra, nos 48 ff.
462 See supra, nos 83 ff.
463 Cf supra, no 184 and (generally) no 90.
464 Cf supra, no 183.
465 On the requirements under art 41(1) CO, cf supra, no 47.
466 Cf Brehm (fn 97) art 44 no 51 with further references.
467 See supra, nos 110 and 116.
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191Liability of A, B, C, and D would be joint and several (art 51 CO),468 both
with respect to X’s pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss.469 Compensation for
non-pecuniary loss would be available under art 47 CO.470
Case 6
192The following analysis is based on the assumption that A and B do not
conduct their joint practice in the form of a company (with independent
legal personality) by whom they are employed.
193A and B might be liable toward X in contract under art 97(1) CO.471
However, X will have to prove that A and B or their auxiliaries made a
mistake which constitutes a breach of contract, and that such breach caused
her damage. C, D, and E all qualify as auxiliaries under art 101(1) CO.472
194As the transmission of E’s staphylococcus infection caused X bodily harm,
and as E is A and B’s auxiliary, transmission as such could qualify as a
breach of contract by A and B under art 101(1) CO. X would have no
difficulty proving causation, as transmission was a conditio sine qua non of
her damage. A and B could only avoid liability if they proved that E
complied with the standard of care owed by A and B themselves, for which
they bear the burden of proof.473 However, they are unlikely to succeed
due to the deficient hygiene standards in their practice.
195A and B’s failure to maintain satisfactory hygiene standards also constitu-
tes a breach of their contract with X. However, under this line of argu-
ment, X would have to prove that such failure more likely than not caused
her damage.474 Whether or not X will be successful in proving causation
will depend on how large the risk of infection would have been had the
usual hygiene standards beenmaintained. It is not recognised in Swiss law
that hospitals and responsible doctors bear the burden of proof with
regard to causation in the case of deficient hygiene standards, although
such a shift in the burden of proof has been suggested in legal doctrine.475
468 On joint and several liability, see supra, no 66.
469 On the latter, see supra, no 129.
470 Cf supra, nos 125 ff.
471 On the requirements under art 97(1) CO, see supra, no 82.
472 On art 101(1) CO, see supra, no 85.
473 Cf supra, no 85.
474 Cf supra, no 56.
475 See Kuhn (fn 154) 601, 650 ff with further references. The Federal Court has not yet
been called on to decide this issue.
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196 A further possibility would be to extend the notion of mistake in treat-
ment by arguing that treatment administered under deficient hygiene
standards is not lege artis. If this line of argument were accepted, the
treatment administered by C and D (ie the injections) would already
constitute a breach of A and B’s contract with X under art 101(1) CO. X
could prove causation as the breach was a conditio sine qua non of her
damage. A and B would be unable to avoid liability as C and D did not
comply with the standard of care owed by A and B themselves (hypothe-
tical fault.)476
197 X could also base her claim against A and B in tort under art 55(1) CO.477
As it is certain that E caused X’s injury, and as E is subordinated to A and
B,478 A and B will only be able to avoid liability if they can show that they
exercised all due diligence in selecting, instructing and overseeing E. As it
is established that the medical assistants were not instructed properly nor
supervised with respect to hygiene, A and B will not succeed. Although A
and B could avoid liability under art 55(1) CO by proving that X’s damage
would also have occurred if they had exercised due diligence,479 it will be
practically impossible for them to provide such proof.
198 C and D could only be liable toward X in tort under art 41(1) CO.480
However, under orthodox rules of causation, X would have to prove
whether it was C or D who administered the harmful injection. If she
cannot provide such proof, neither C nor D will be held liable.481 X would
also have to prove that the doctor who gave the injection was at fault.
199 Although E caused X’s damage, she could only become liable toward X
under art 41(1) CO if X could prove that E acted negligently.482 Such proof
will only succeed if X can show that E knew or ought to have known of her
staphylococcus infection and the associated risks.
200 Accordingly, A and B are likely to be liable toward X in contract and in
tort. If X is unable to perform all of her household tasks because of her
injury, she will be entitled to compensation on the basis of the average cost
476 Cf supra, no 85.
477 On the requirements for liability under art 55(1) CO, see supra, nos 48 ff.
478 Depending on how long C and D were working as locums in A and B’s practice, it is
possible that E might be considered to be subordinated to C and D, rather than to A
and B. In that case, A and B would not be liable toward X under art 55(1) CO. On the
issue of de facto subordination, see supra, no 48.
479 Cf supra, no 50.
480 But cf fn 478. On the requirements under art 41(1) CO, cf supra, no 47.
481 On this issue of alternative causation, see supra, no 60.
482 Cf supra, no 54.
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of home help, regardless of whether she actually employs such help or
whether help is given free of charge.483 A and B will also be liable for non-
pecuniary loss under art 47 CO.484
Variation 1
201Although the source of the infection cannot be identified, A and B will
nonetheless be liable toward X in contract if X can prove that she probably
would not have suffered damage if A and B had maintained satisfactory
hygiene standards. This will again depend on how large the risk of
infection would have been had the usual hygiene standards been main-
tained.485
202As before, another possibility would be to extend the notion of mistake in
treatment by arguing that treatment administered under deficient hy-
giene standards is not lege artis. In this case, A and B would be unable to
avoid liability as C and D did not comply with the standard of care owed
by A and B themselves.486
203In contrast, as the source of the infection cannot be identified, X cannot
hold A and B liable under art 55(1) CO as she will be unable to prove that
damage was caused by a subordinate.487
204As in the first scenario, C and D could only be liable toward X under
art 41(1) CO if X succeeded in proving which doctor administered the
harmful injection, and also that such doctor was at fault.488 E will not be
liable under art 41(1) CO as X is unable to prove that E caused her damage.
Variation 2
205In this scenario, the only person who might be held liable toward X is E,
on the basis of art 41(1) CO. However, such claim will only succeed if X can
prove that E acted negligently.489
483 See supra, no 117.
484 On liability for non-pecuniary loss, cf supra, nos 124 ff.
485 See already supra, no 195.
486 Cf supra, no 196.
487 See supra, no 61.
488 See supra, no 198.
489 See already supra, no 199.
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